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Abstract 
 
Title: When control leads to confusion - normative control in the decision-making stage of 
FEI to NPPD in a growing company 
Date of the seminar: Wednesday, May, 17th, 2017 
Course: ENTN39 Master´s Corporate Entrepreneurship and Innovation Internship and degree 
project (Master´s thesis 15 ECTS) 
Research question: How do high levels of normative control affect organizational learning 
and the decision-making stage at the Front End of the Innovation Process to the NPPD in a 
growing company? 
Authors: Hendrikje Geerse and Sandra Kirchberger 
Supervisor:  Håkan Lagerquist 
Examiner:  Ass. Professor Sotaro Shibayama 
Methodology: A qualitative, single case study was conducted in a Swedish technology 
company using semi-structured interviews with people involved at the decision-making stage 
of the FEI to NPPD as a main source to gather empirical data. Iterating between interview 
data and literature the findings were used to address the gap in literature and answer the 
research question. 
Theoretical perspectives: The three main fields of research applied in this dissertation are 
firstly the front end of innovation, normative control and lastly organizational learning. In 
particular, the implications and relations of high levels of normative control on organizational 
learning and the innovation process at the decision-making stage from FEI to NPPD, where 
all three areas culminate, are established.    
Conclusions: High levels of normative control are a tool positively connected with employee 
motivation, informal networking activities and intuitive decision-making. They ensure 
freedom and creativity for people working at the FEI. However, this research found that a 
company growing in complexity/size will experience negative effects in the learning 
processes at the FEI, as knowledge stays mostly tacit and decisions are often based on gut-
feeling. The low levels of formal control allow employees to dismiss decisions taken by 
management and resources can be wasted.    
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acts; formal control; decision making; informal networks; knowledge transfer; political 
behavior; 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
 
It is widely recognized that innovation is crucial for organizations to survive in an 
increasingly competitive environment that is also characterized by rapid changes in terms of 
new markets, technologies and even culture and social norms (Nonaka et al., 2000; Bates & 
Khasawneh, 2005). Companies that do not innovate will risk a higher, negative impact of 
these shifts, especially when competitors were able to capitalize upon them, as new products 
and new businesses are imperative to achieve “sustained growth and competitive advantage” 
(Cooper, 1990, p. 44; Kuratko et al., 2011). As product lifecycles are becoming increasingly 
shorter and misdirected efforts lead to more substantial losses of resources, this necessitates a 
solid procedure for developing innovative products (Nobelius & Trygg, 2002). 
 
The front end of innovation (hereafter: FEI) “is the stage during which ideas are created and 
further developed into product concepts and definitions, ending with a ‘go’ or ‘no go’ 
decision about whether to continue into formal NPD or not” (Florén & Frishammar, 2012, p. 
20). Thus, the fate and the main characteristics of the future product are all decided in the FEI: 
ideas will be scrutinized for their possible future value and their alignment with the 
company’s strategy and vision (Florén & Frishammar, 2012; Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009). 
The FEI is completed when the concept enters the New Product and Process Development 
stage (NPPD), which is a structured, disciplined and goal-oriented process where the concept 
will be developed and commercialized (Koen et al., 2001). 
 
It has been found that when a company grows, the increasing size necessitates more formal 
structures to operate efficiently and effectively (Kuratko et al., 2011). Large organizations 
encounter problems in managing innovation, as companies need to balance freedom with 
discipline. In explorative innovation, the promotion of experimentation and imagination is 
crucial which necessitates more autonomy. On the other hand, a steady flow of products that 
are continuously brought to market must also be maintained (Feldman, 1989; Poskela & 
Martinsuo, 2009). This is also why Koen et al. argue that both the FEI and NPPD “need to be 
aligned with the business strategy to ensure an uninterrupted, flowing pipeline of new 
products and processes with value to the corporation” (2001, p. 49).  
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This alignment compares to a balancing act, where the exploitation of the core business with 
relatively secure return on investment needs to be harmonized with the pressure to be 
innovative, which involves resource allocation without guaranteed profit (March, 1991).  
 
As innovative ideas necessarily encompass risk due to uncertainty, the decision to invest or 
reject is significant, since it will guide the company’s future activities and product portfolios 
(Kastensson & Johansson, 2011). It has been found that well-defined decision criteria are of 
significant importance in evaluating and ultimately deciding on potential new products 
(Carbonell-Foulquié et al., 2004, p. 307).  
 
It has been found that lack of creativity is not a problem, but the evaluation process that 
judges the potential is more troublesome (Magnusson et al., 2014). A more formal approach 
to decision-making is usually rather structured and built around explicit criteria, which is 
often described as a funneling process: all the ideas will go through the funnel, needing to 
pass various gates: this refinement procedure is characterized by having certain set standards 
(Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; Cooper, 1990).  
An alternative to a more formal decision process is the use of intuition, where those who are 
in charge of the evaluation assess potential by using their interpretive capabilities, which 
makes it less time-consuming than the formal approach (Magnusson et al., 2014). Elbanna 
defines intuition as: “often associated with having a hunch or a strong feeling of knowing 
what is going to occur, without explaining the rationale behind it” (Elbanna, 2006, p. 10).  
 
As control mechanisms reflect the culture of a company, it could be argued how the corporate 
culture impacts the screening phase of the FEI and influences criteria that are used, since 
culture acts as glue by giving employees a shared purpose and collective behavioral attitudes 
(Sørensen, 2002; Welch & Welch, 2006). Sørensen (2002) also concludes in his paper that 
firms with a strong culture have an advantage when it comes to developing incremental 
innovations in a rather secure and steady environment as the strong culture has been 
connected with increased reliability, but this advantage is lost when the environment gets 
more unpredictable. 
 
It is here where the relevance of organizational learning comes in, conceptualized by Senge & 
Sterman as “the process whereby shared understandings and strategies change” (1992, p. 
138). Knowledge is recognized as a critical mechanism that provides companies with a 
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competitive advantage, since improved insights and knowledge result in improved 
productivity (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Nonaka et al., 2000). Knowledge comes in two forms: 
explicit and tacit knowledge. The former is characterized by formal and systemic language; 
the latter is more personal since it relates to subjective insights and intuition. Yet, it is argued 
that both knowledge sources are interrelated and pivotal to create new knowledge (Nonaka et 
al., 2000). Knowledge can be transferred through a variety of mechanisms, one of which is the 
network structure that is present in a company. Research has underlined the relationship 
between network structures and the effect that its nature has on organizational performance: 
employees working in different departments often hold unique knowledge that is related to 
their domain only. Should employees collaborate together, this knowledge will be combined 
which contributes to organizational learning (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). 
 
It is acknowledged that both, the level of control and organizational learning influence the 
company culture and that the culture itself facilitates this dynamic, thus having an important 
role in learning and change (Brown & Duguid, 2005). In addition, it has been found that a 
company culture that fosters learning and development is more likely to create constant 
innovative output as insight is created about the identification, replicability and adaption of 
opportunities among employees, which will lead to an increased future understanding of new 
opportunities (Hurley & Hult, 1998). Managers play a crucial role in creating organizational 
learning and providing levels of control regarding the innovation process, as they are in 
charge of the efficient and effective utilization of the resources under their control (Nonaka et 
al., 2000; Kuratko, 2011). 
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1.2 Problem discussion 
 
Various researchers have agreed that the nature of the FEI is characterized by high degrees of 
complexity, uncertainty, ad hoc decision making and an informal organizational setting (Koen 
et al., 2001; Kim & Wilemon, 2002; Florén & Frishammar, 2012). Therefore, managers are 
most able to influence strategic choices at the start of innovation process (Poskela & 
Martinsuo, 2009).  
In order to reduce uncertainty and risk, it is argued that formal controls such as project 
management or stage-and-gate-type systems could be implemented, which would bring forth 
more order and efficient handling at the FEI (Schultz et al., 2013). Formal control thus 
curtails unbalanced information across the employees since their activities are coordinated. 
This is also argued to enhance employee motivation, as long as the directives give employees 
enough room to be creative and independent in solving problems in the FEI (Poskela & 
Martinsuo, 2009; Schultz et al., 2013).  
On the other hand, controlling the process may lead to rigidity within the organization, as the 
very nature of innovation demands a more flexible approach to allow for the pursuit of risky 
and unprecedented projects (Schultz et al., 2013). Indeed, Cooper (2014) explains that a lot of 
critique regarding the Stage-Gate process labels it as “too linear, too rigid, and too planned to 
handle more innovative approaches” (2014, p. 20).  
 
Yet, in light of the portrayed discussions regarding the need to balance exploration or 
exploitation (i.e. prioritizing resources for either core business or new business), which is 
complicated due to uncertainty of FEI activities, and the necessity to have an environment that 
encourages uncertainty, risk-propensity and experimentation as to prevent undermining 
employees’ creativity, it follows that companies are struggling to coordinate between control 
and freedom (Feldman, 1989; March, 1991; Welch & Welch, 2006).  
 
As stated, a more formal approach to decision-making in the FEI is characterized by having 
formal criteria, leading to a funneling process which will refine the innovative concept. 
However, there is no consensus about a set of criteria for this screening, as all ideas are 
varying in their nature and are dependent on specific company capabilities and strategies as 
well (Balachandra & Friar, 1997; Hart et al., 2003). In addition, rationally deciding about a 
new, innovative opportunity is challenging as individuals lack crucial information to make an 
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all fact-based, informed decision. In adopting formalized criteria to conclude a decision-
making process, companies could therefore risk that this leads to “achieving tomorrow’s 
solution to yesterday’s problem” (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1970, p. 121). Interestingly, it has 
been found that relying on intuition is becoming gradually endorsed as an acceptable 
approach to make decisions (Elbanna, 2006; Dane & Pratt, 2007, Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 
2004). The benefit hereof is also that it allows for faster decision-making procedures; since 
formalized processes are more time consuming (Magnusson et al., 2014). Sadler-Smith and 
Shefy (2004) elaborate further in explaining intuitive decision-making as “a composite 
phenomenon involving interplay between knowing (intuition-as-expertise) and sensing 
(intuition-as-feeling)” (ibid. 2004, p.76), stating that management applies knowledge gathered 
from experience and inkling based on business acumen especially in situations where there is 
a lack of obtainable information, which applies to the FEI. 
 
On the other hand, the notion of using intuitive decision-making is opposed by scholars who 
doubt whether intuitive decision-making leads to effective decisions and therefore prefer more 
rational models (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Intuition entails risks, because reliance on a hunch may 
not be reflective of the potential of an idea. Indeed, when the cost of failure will not affect 
viability of a company, it is argued it makes more sense to rely on intuition, or when decisions 
are made about exploitative information which is in the realm of managers’ knowledge base 
and therefore intuition will reflect expert information about the potential of an innovative 
concept (Miller & Ireland, 2005).  
 
Whereas the means to make decisions are discussed, it remains rather unclear what factors 
will lead to for example, either more formalized decision-making or intuitive decision-
making. It could be argued how culture influences this, as culture refers to the entrenched 
values, norms and beliefs within a company and also reflects the climate, which comprises 
“recurring patterns of behavior, attitudes and feelings that characterize life in the 
organization” (Tidd & Bessant, 2014, p.72).  
In a more formal culture, company processes are regulated and therefore predictable as 
standards are set. This translates to impersonal, regulating control mechanisms, which are 
believed to stabilize the company (Leifer & Mills, 196; Yang et al., 2011). However, it has 
been found that a culture that is characterized by trust and openness is more compatible with 
entrepreneurial activities (Tidd & Bessant, 2014). This is in line with normative control 
mechanisms, which intrinsically motivate employees to use suitable ways to achieve certain 
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goals.  
It thus predetermines how employees are to act in achieving their goals. However, it does not 
say anything about the scope in which employees are to act. Yet, as normative forms of 
control emphasize collective responsibility, cohesion and uniformity, it is expected that 
employees will act in the best interests of the company anyway (Alexander, 2012).  
On the other hand, conformity with the company strategy is underlined: managers need to 
regulate interactions and set priorities, so that FEI activities will be conducted in the best 
interests of the company (Feldman, 1989). Amabile has argued that “people will be more 
creative if you give them freedom to decide how to climb a particular mountain. You needn’t 
let them choose which mountain to climb” (1998, p.81), meaning that setting a 
comprehensible goal can often increase employee’s creativity instead of stifling it. 
Building on these arguments, Schultz et al. (2013) talk about the importance of decision-
making clarity, summarizing those findings as follows: “Clear goals and transparent decision-
making processes are among management’s primary tools for keeping NP[P]D projects on 
schedule, within budget and aligned with strategic goals […]” (2013, p.434). However, it is 
unclear whether clear decision-making processes are compatible with normative control, since 
this leaves considerable freedom for employees to interpret what they are to act on. On the 
other hand, normative control does allow the multiple iterations that characterize activities in 
the FEI: sharing knowledge across various individuals and units that are part of the innovation 
process is a significant component in innovation (Kuratko, 2011). 
 
This relates to the introduced concept of organizational learning, as this leads to 
organizational effectiveness and enhances the possibility to create value: Gold et al. state that 
this could lead to an “improved ability to innovate, improved coordination of efforts, and 
rapid commercialization of new products” (2001, p. 196). 
Fahey & Prusak argue that tacit knowledge, which they define as the “body of perspectives 
[…], perceptions […], beliefs […], and values […]” (1998, p. 268), is also the way in which 
explicit knowledge is processed, as tacit knowledge is responsible for the interpretation of 
explicit knowledge (Fahey & Prusak, 1998, p. 268). Nevertheless, tacit knowledge is much 
more complicated to share and convey than codified knowledge (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). 
It can be seen how the interpretation of new ideas is a political process as the potential of an 
idea is discussed: the strength of an argument or the influence people have will determine the 
future direction of an idea. This is more likely to occur in an environment that bolsters 
particular interpretations and rejects others (Lawrence et al., 2005). Indeed, in the light of an 
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informal decision-making process that occurs in a company that is characterized by normative 
control, it has been found that political behavior can influence important decisions. This is 
likely to occur in the FEI, since front end activities usually require the support of employees 
from various departments who might hold opposing interests and act on different agendas 
(Kyriazis et al., 2007).  
 
1.3 Purpose 
 
The debate about formal and informal control measures regarding the FEI is not exhausted 
yet. It seems as if literature has reached an impasse about  the debate concerning formal 
control measures versus normative control (which is, as stated, characterized by informal 
measures) in a company: ideally, a balance is struck between the ‘right amount of control’ 
that is appropriate for front end activities as to ensure alignment with the organizational 
strategy. However, there are other criteria that are used to evaluate the potential.  
 
It can be seen in the previous section how decision-making clarity, which includes the concept 
of rationality and formalization, could reduce conflicts because of clearly set goals. 
Normative control is built around the notion of shared goals and vision which drives the 
company forward and therefore does not set a scope for employees to act in. We aim to 
contribute to current control, organizational learning (OL) and FEI literature, by exploring the 
impact that high levels of normative control have on OL and the decision-making stage at the 
FEI. Normative control partially seems to be an ideal method to ‘structure’ the FEI, yet in 
light of a growing company, that often experiences difficulties in overseeing the total 
company performance, it is not known how the FEI decision-making stage looks like. 
 
As informal measures flourish under normative control, it can be seen how networking and 
the role that tacit knowledge plays herein would occur. Whereas previous studies of the FEI 
have focused on finding ways to reduce the ambiguity of front end activities, or how to build 
up competences in the FEI and make the overall FEI process more comprehensible 
(Christiansen & Gasparin, 2016; Koen et al. 2001; Florén & Frishammar, 2012; Khurana & 
Rosenthal, 1998; Reinertsen, 1999), there is little academic research that takes informal or 
social control mechanisms into account. We build on the recommendation of Schultz et al., 
who focused on applied formalized methods in the FEI: Whereas they found that decision-
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making clarity occurs under formalized procedures that stage gate systems bring about, they 
drew attention to the fact “that company performance is also often influenced by informal or 
social control mechanisms” (Schultz et al., 2013). Therefore, we introduce the possible 
mediating effect that normative control has on the decision-making stage of the FEI, by also 
exploring how normative control operates, which is by informal methods such as networking. 
Rather than focusing on how the ideation phase of the FEI should look like, we aim to 
contribute by showing how normative control impacts the decision-making stage and OL, as 
well as the resulting repercussions between FEI and OL (figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The dynamic relationship between the three research areas 
  
1.4 Research question 
 
It is clear that the innovation process is rather complex as various factors are interrelated. 
Indeed, the concepts we explore comprise a wide field of research in their own right. 
Therefore, we assume that the more our iterative process develops, we will identify 
multidimensional findings that will underline the various phases and characteristics that 
innovative activities comprise. However, as we identified dissatisfaction with our case 
company regarding the problematic transition phase from FEI to NPPD, we aim to focus on 
the dynamic which we think could help understand why the transition phase from FEI to 
NPPD is slow and frustrating. As mentioned, many ideas to improve the FEI are built around 
optimizing efficiency in the FEI in order to increase the speed of either accepting ideas or 
declining them. We have found that the type and thereby the amount of control set by 
management and the extent to which the culture in the company can be connected to 
organizational learning impedes on efficiency and creates unnecessary delays in the 
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innovation process. We assume to identify multiple findings when we are to identify how 
certain communication structures function, how different sets of knowledge and expertise 
relate to each other and how this translates to the levels of control and the extent to which 
organizational learning occurs. Naturally, we connect this to the troublesome decision-making 
stage, as we are to understand difficulties our company experiences in light of the above-
mentioned linkages. In doing so, we are able to shed light on how the decision-making stage 
could be understood and where possible improvements are situated.  
 
Our research question therefore is:  
 
“How do high levels of normative control affect organizational learning and the decision-
making stage at the Front End of the Innovation Process to the NPPD in a growing 
company?”  
 
1.5 Case company 
 
Our research has been conducted in a Swedish technology company that holds a global 
market leader position in supplying network cameras for surveillance purposes. The company 
was founded in 1984 and gained momentum in the late 90s with innovative technology in 
video surveillance. As a result, the company expanded significantly, employing roughly 2600 
employees currently (1/2017) compared to 500 people in 2008 and 1100 in 2011 (Year-end 
report 2016, case company). From 2011 to 2016, the headcount increased by 136%, owing to 
the growing international presence of the firm as well as the creation of new departments and 
functions, making the company overall more complex. The company has an informal 
structure, characterized by an ’open door policy’ and an emphasis on collectivity. Most of the 
employees– especially those involved in the innovation department – have an engineering 
background, in either mechanical engineering or computer science which they developed at 
Swedish universities. The manufacturing of the products is outsourced and the company has 
an indirect sales model, where distributors are the primary clients.  
During our research, the innovation department was our focal point. This department is 
responsible for introducing next generation technology for a new feature/function, or a new 
product concept. These concepts are then presented to a Steering Committee (SC) and if the 
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concept is approved, it will be implemented within a product department’s road map in the 
NPPD.  
Currently, the company is facing increasing pressure to reinvent themselves in order to meet 
the challenges that the growing competition and the declining value of market shares pose. 
Whilst the innovation department is providing the company with new concepts, the majority 
hereof get rejected with vague justification of the Steering Committee.  
It is acknowledged that the success rate of innovative concepts in general is quite low. 
However, it is clear that the process could be improved by locating the obstacles that 
complicate a smoother innovation process, identifying the dynamic that reinforces those 
obstacles and revisiting the assumptions on which the innovation process within the 
innovation department is founded.  
18 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Front End of Innovation 
 
2.1.1 FEI: a description 
Most researchers agree that the innovation process consists of three different stages: the front 
end stage, the new product and process development stage and the commercialization stage 
(Nobelius & Trygg, 2002; Ho & Tsai, 2011).  
 
The FEI begins when an opportunity is considered deserving of further exploration and 
concludes when a company chooses to commit resources to its development, after which the 
project development process can be put in motion (Kim & Wilemon, 2002). The main tasks of 
front end activities are known to be exploration, opportunity recognition and idea/concept 
generation (Florén & Frishammar, 2012). The front end should result in a well-defined 
product concept and a business plan that is in line with the firm’s strategy. This will ensure 
that long-term strategic objectives will be accomplished (Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009; Florén 
& Frishammar, 2012). When the concept is accepted, it is fit to enter the formal and usually 
quite structured New Product and Process Development (hereafter: NPPD) stage. The 
commercialization phase consists of the transformation of the concept into a physical product 
and then will be fully integrated in the company’s product portfolio (Kuratko et al., 2011, p. 
390). Whereas the currently common front end models are very much alike in the amount of 
phases, the nature of activities, subject matter and context, there are some factors which are 
specific to a certain model, which has not led to a dependable vision of how the front end can 
best be handled (Nobelius & Trygg, 2002). In order to provide an overview of this finding and 
to illustrate an interpretation of what the FEI looks like, Koen et al.’s (2001) New Concept 
Development model (NCD) will be explained, which is shown in figure 2.  
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Figure 2: New Concept Development Model by Koen et al. (2001) 
 
According to Koen et al. (2001) the front end of innovation consists of five stages: 1) 
opportunity identification, 2) opportunity analysis, where it is explored how the idea can be 
translated to specific business opportunities which diminishes uncertainty, 3) idea genesis, 
where the idea will develop and mature, going through many iterations and changes 4) idea 
selection and 5) concept and technology development, which consists of creating a business 
plan after which the idea can be forwarded to the NPPD.  Encompassing the circle shown in 
figure 2 are influencing factors, like competition, internal capabilities and business strategies. 
Koen et al.’s (2001) NCD construct is purposefully shaped circular, in order to highlight the 
iterative and permeable nature of the innovation process at the FEI.  
 
Florén and Frishammar described three core activities that are similar to the ones of Koen et 
al.: 1) idea and concept development, 2) idea and concept alignment and 3) concept 
legitimization. The first activity starts when an opportunity is recognized, characterized by 
creativity and experimentation. The idea will be refined to give direction, and screened to 
determine whether an idea should be further developed or not. The second activity, idea and 
concept alignment, concerns assuring fit between the emerging idea and the firm’s strategy 
plus other internal operations. Simultaneously, a fit between the idea and the external 
environment is explored. Lastly, concept legitimization revolves around the protection of the 
concept, since socio-political factors may intervene. Otherwise, good ideas run the risk of 
being ignored or rejected, because legitimization is lacking. On the other hand, bad ideas may 
20 
 
be pushed too far in their development, because they are supported by powerful individuals 
within the company (Reinertsen, 1999; Florén & Frishammar, 2012).  
The front end is regarded as the most troublesome phase of the innovation process and at the 
same time as one of the greatest opportunities to improve the overall innovation capability of 
a company (Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009; Koen et al. 2001; Florén & Frishammar, 2012). It 
has been found that effective front-end activities contribute to the success of a new product 
and in addition, it will enhance the company’s ability to adapt and renew itself strategically, a 
crucial factor considering the changing environment. In addition, time-to-market margins 
could be improved as the development time could be reduced (Kim & Wilemon, 2002; 
Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009; Ho & Tsai, 2011).  
 
The NPPD will act on the product definition that is created during the FEI: therefore, the FEI 
should prepare a comprehensible product concept and also select the right opportunity to give 
guidance to development requirements (Florén & Frishammar, 2012). Kim and Wilemon 
highlight this important step as follows: “A well-defined product concept allows for a clearer 
understanding of development time, costs, required technical expertise, the right development 
team, market potential and positioning, risk and organizational fit” (2002, p. 271).  
 
As our case company experiences difficulties at the end stage of the front end process, our 
focus is not on opportunity recognition or ideation, the fuzzy, vague parts at the beginning of 
the front end. For that reason, the terminology adopted for this paper is the term Front End of 
Innovation (FEI) coined by Koen et al. (2001) instead of the term ‘fuzzy front end’. 
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2.1.2 FEI to NPPD: the decision-making stage 
Usually, the concepts developed in the Front End need to meet certain criteria to enter the 
next stage in the innovation process. These criteria are reviewed by some sort of gatekeeper, 
which is either an individual or a group of people making a joint decision at the transition 
point to grant or deny the entrance to the formal NPPD and commercialization process that 
needs the allocation of resources (financial and human resources), hence committing “to the 
funding and launch of a new product development project, or [deciding] not to do this (the 
continue/no-go decision)” (Khurana and Rosenthal, 1998, p.59).  
In the case company, this role has been taken on by a Steering Committee, consisting of four 
middle and two senior managers. They decide if the concept is fit to enter the New Product 
and Process Development (NPPD), the second stage. This stage is defined as a formal and 
well-structured process, that conceptualizes the idea more concretely (Koen et al., 2001).  
 
It can be seen how a clearly defined product definition is crucial for the selection phase, since 
a better understanding is developed about cost, risk, organizational fit and development time. 
However, features of the FEI are still fuzzy, characterized by uncertainties and uncontrollable 
factors (Kim & Wilemon, 2002). In addition, it is difficult to gather reliable information and 
the innovation process is quite dynamic: the FEI is characterized as unstructured and 
exhibiting low levels of formalization (Kim & Wilemon, 2002 ; Ho & Tsai, 2011). It has been 
found that the high-tech industry is very complex which exacerbates the difficulties in 
managing the FEI (Nobelius & Trygg, 2002). The increasing environmental uncertainty such 
as shifting market conditions, evolving competition and changing customer preferences 
combined with the vague nature of the FEI itself, show the necessity of companies to establish 
innovative procedures to succeed in an environment full of uncertainties (Ho & Tsai, 2011). 
However, as Kim and Wilemon put it: “some of the most important barriers to rapid, effective 
FFE performance are lack of vision […], lack of perceived urgency […], lack of formalization 
[…], lack of effective project leadership […], ineffective communication processes […] and 
ineffective people conducting the FFE work […]” (2002, p. 271).  
It follows that it is hard to evaluate FEI performance, since traditional measures (key 
performance indicators etc.) can be used to a limited extent only, which means that “the 
explorative nature of the front end requires putting emphasis on more immediate and 
perception-based criteria” (Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009, p. 673). Indeed, “current research 
indicates that the idea evaluation processes of many firms are ad hoc or intuitive, with very 
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few firms having defined methods” (Forde & Fox, 2016, p. 48). After all, there is a lack of a 
theory that can predict the outcome of an innovation cycle or determine which ideas are better 
suited towards specific future outcomes, which ultimately would reduce the risk involved. 
However, “it remains impossible to select ideas from the future” (Forde & Fox, 2016, p. 48). 
Both formalized and informal decision-making stages have advantages and disadvantages. 
Using a highly analytical method to make a decision is costly in terms of time and stifling 
employees’ creativity with strict boundaries. This approach may therefore obstruct the 
adopting of new products and concepts. Going with a low analytical method is less costly in 
terms of resources and quicker, but holds the risk of continuing with high-risk projects, which 
might boost the number of innovative projects at the expense of their quality (Lejarraga & 
Martinez-Ros, 2014). 
 
2.1.3 FEI: control vs. autonomy 
As highlighted in 2.1.2, optimizing the hand-over decision from FEI to NPPD holds the key to 
a more efficient innovation process. That means coalescing two very different processes: 
whereas the status of an idea is problematic, fuzzy and easy to change in the FEI, it is clear, 
specific and difficult to change in the NPPD. In the FEI, the available information is 
qualitative and informal, compared to quantitative and formal in the NPPD. It is a blueprint 
versus a product; the width and depth is broad and thin, versus narrow but detailed in the 
NPPD. It becomes more difficult to reject an idea in the NPPD, as the damage if the idea gets 
rejected is substantial. The likelihood that this occurs is rather low, since commitment of 
higher management is high, compared to small in the FEI (Koen et al., 2001; Kim & 
Wilemon, 2002). 
 
In formalizing the FEI, it follows that the process will be more controlled, using Feldman’s 
definition of control as “the exercise of authority through a hierarchical structure that limits or 
channels behaviour” (1989, p.86). Various authors have emphasized that this will bring many 
benefits: the scope will be focused, managers can intervene and guide the project by making 
decisions, organizational learning will be increased and the coordination of activities are 
enhanced, suggesting that new product success may, at least partly, depend on the existence 
and efficiency of a defined, formal front-end process model (Kim & Wilemon, 2002; Poskela 
& Martinsuo, 2009). It has been found that in organizing front end activities around strategic 
goals, the NPPD process and organizational performance will be optimized (Ho & Tsai, 
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2011). However, if the FEI is not handled in an efficacious manner, a concept can pass on to 
the development phase without adequate preparation, which can in return cause project delay 
and therefore overspending on budget (Kim & Wilemon, 2002).  
As stated before, a clear organizational strategy has been found to positively impact 
organizational performance, indicating that an alignment of the organizational strategy in the 
FEI is needed in defining the scope (Zheng et al., 2010). This is in line with Amabile’s 
mountain metaphor in chapter 1 (1998, p. 81) in providing people with a comprehensible goal 
(which mountain to climb) and supports Tidd and Bessant’s finding that a “clearly articulated 
and shared sense of purpose” (2004, p.62) is a component of the innovative organization.  
 
On the other hand, there are recognized disadvantages with process formalization and 
managerial control, like “decreased innovativeness; increased corner-cutting; negative 
attitudes among employees; excess bureaucracy and decreased flexibility” (Poskela & 
Martinsuo, 2009, p. 675). Indeed, a high level of formal control can make the innovation 
process too bureaucratic, “slowing down the organization, stifling the employee, and 
encouraging almost mechanical performance” (Kuratko et al., 2011, p. 297). In addition, 
formalizing the FEI has been found difficult due to the limited information and understanding 
at this point. Koen et al. find that the definition of the financial return is “at best often just a 
wild guess” (2001, p. 51). Therefore, it is crucial that organizational support stimulates 
employees who work in the FEI, because if the upper echelon is not supportive or shows no 
dedication, employees working with innovation will be dispirited in pursuing new ideas (Kim 
& Wilemon, 2002). The organization itself needs to be open-minded and ready for technology 
changes that are disruptive, which calls for risk propensity and an overall accepting attitude 
towards the possibility of failure (Ho & Tsai, 2011). 
 
2.1.4 FEI in large, complex companies 
Feldman argues that especially large, specialized organizations have problems in managing 
innovation, as it “involves both the simultaneous regulation of autonomy and control in order 
to promote both creativity and experimentation and the production of results that can be 
manufactured, marketed or institutionalized” (1989, p.84). Most authors hold that large 
companies typically employ over 500 people (Karlsson & Olsson, 1998). However, structures 
and strategies in incumbent companies strengthen prevalent systems which lead to rigidity 
and inertia in those systems, making it difficult for mature companies to change and adapt 
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(Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). Of course, large organizations hold several advantages regarding 
innovative activities: they are less dependent on local customers and suppliers, and benefit 
from more knowledge and financial resources. On the other hand, large organizations are less 
agile and more bureaucratic, which hinders them to react fast and efficiently to technology 
and market changes (Karlsson & Olsson, 1998). Yet, larger organizations can undertake more 
activities, which, according to Thompson and van den Broek “add more layers of complexity, 
qualification and variation” (2010, p. 8) to a company. They identified that employees 
therefore acknowledge that pooled and permanent features of controls are necessary, since 
investigating interfaces and interactions are valuable (Thompson & van den Broek 2010). It is 
important to underline the difference between the size of a company and the complexity of the 
company. Whereas the size of a company refers to the amount of employees and operational 
activity, complexity refers to the organizational design of a company (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 
2004). Indeed, Simon and Perrow, two renowned researchers for their work on complexity in 
organizations, have stated that the complexity of a company can be understood in terms of the 
rigid hierarchal structure that is most often present (Simon, 1962; Perrow, 1972). Simon 
views a complex system as “a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way” (1962, 
p.468); where it is challenging to infer the properties of all parts in the company. He argues 
that complexity frequently takes the form of hierarchy (ibid. p.468). Indeed, Perrow 
understands complexity as the presence of “hierarchy, rules, divisions of labor and tenure 
provisions” (1972, p. 55).  
 
Our definition of complexity with regards to the case company and literature: “Growing 
headcount, international and local expansion lead to an increasing complexity of the case 
company concerning employee interaction, knowledge transfer etc.”  
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2.2 Normative control 
2.2.1 Normative control: a definition and explanation  
There are various forms of control, which is why it makes sense to introduce a definition of 
control first. Cardinal found that the term control refers to “any process by which managers 
direct attention, motivate, and encourage organizational members to act in desired ways to 
meet the firm’s objectives” (2001, p. 22). Norms are found to be crucial as it awards meaning 
to one’s behavior. Therefore, norms contribute to reciprocal comprehension and as such, 
appropriate behavior amongst employees can be synchronized and social order established 
(Hechter, 2008). Companies that are characterized by normative control are found to be 
informal, and norms generate “stability by setting socially determined expectations for 
behavior driven by morals and obligations” (Alexander, 2012, p. 796). This behavior is 
characterized by an emphasis on uniformity and the collective group as a whole. Collective 
responsibility, loyalty and mutual obligations bolster the importance of cooperating instead of 
acting individually (Alexander, 2012). Indeed, the dimension of individualism-collectivism, a 
cultural construct that is connected to normative forms of control, refers to “the extent 
individuals ascribe their identity from the self rather than from their relationship to others in 
the group” (Alexander, 2012, p. 796). If a company is characterized by a collectivist culture, it 
is found that implicit informal control mechanisms should prevent expedience from occurring 
(Alexander, 2012). Managerial discourse about normative control essentially revolves around 
the idea that employees can best be regulated by appealing to their thoughts and emotions. 
This subtle way of control has been found to increase loyalty and commitment (Barley & 
Kunda, 1992; Alexander, 2012). This explains why those who advocate normative control, in 
replying to the critique that shared beliefs might blur the boundaries between the individual 
and the organization, argue that this softening of boundaries does not lead to a loss of 
individualism or autonomy. In fact, it is argued that such cultures boost autonomy, as 
“employees could be trusted to act in the organization’s best interest” (Barley & Kunda, 1992, 
p. 383).  This finding of Barley and Kunda is not novel: Knights & Willmott (1987) also 
argued that the power relations are subtle, as the employees internalize their normative 
structures that confirm their position. The employees and their sense of norms and the role 
they play in an organization depend upon and are encouraging the recreation of the prevalent 
forms of control (Knights & Willmott, 1987). In more recent research, Kärreman and 
Alvesson also found that “organizational activity is significantly regulated and shaped by 
ideational and normative elements” (2004, p. 156). In addition, they confirm the findings of 
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Knights and Willmott: organizational structures are reproduced through the sense-giving, 
directions and actions of all those who are part of the company (Kärreman & Alvesson, 2004).  
Of late, Welch & Welch (2006) have stated that management teams of multinational 
companies are struggling with control and coordination issues, trying to address these 
problems by using both formal and informal control mechanisms. They define informal 
control mechanisms as “informal communication through channels such as personal 
relationship networks that cross organization functions [...] and normative control through 
shared values, that is, internalization of a corporate culture” (Welch & Welch, 2006, p. 15). 
Indeed, Welch and Welch found supporting evidence that “the use of corporate culture [is] a 
way of uniting a dispersed organization through commitment to a shared goal in which 
organizational behavior is built around shared values” (2006, p.15). Those authors who view 
culture as an informal control mechanism tend to see culture also as a management tool that 
can be altered and shaped by top management (Welch & Welch, 2006). Chatman and Cha 
(2003) claim that, in actively handling culture, a company is better able to meet its strategic 
objectives in the future. However, it is also found that strong cultures can produce negative 
effects in situations where the environment is changing – this requires new approaches that 
may dictate changes in the prevalent culture to facilitate responsiveness to these shifts. Welch 
& Welch found that this is especially true when the environment is volatile, which 
necessitates the need to “decommit, develop new skills, to explore, to learn at a number of 
different levels, or to newly commit to different approaches” (2006, p. 18).  
 
Our definition of normative control within a company is: “The informal, value-driven method 
of coordination of employee activity which allows considerable autonomy regarding the 
objectives to act on, but sets normative boundaries of employee behavior regarding the way 
they act to achieve those objectives”.  
 
2.2.2 Normative control and decision-making 
However, even back in the 1970s, Mintzberg et al. (1976) asked how normative models of 
management can make unstructured yet strategic decisions. These authors define the decision 
process as “a set of actions and dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a 
stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to action” (Mintzberg et al., 1976, 
p. 246). The unstructured part of decision-making in that context then refers to “decision 
processes that have not been encountered in quite the same form and for which no 
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predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exists in the organizations” (Mintzberg et 
al., 1976, p. 246). Making the assumption that group decisions have an advantage over 
individual ones since expertise and unique perspectives are brought together is tempting. 
However, the research of Lightle et al. (2006) has shown that groups consistently fail to 
combine the available information. The main reason for this is located in the fact that groups 
more often discuss general information; whereas the individual has private information that is 
withheld. Decision-making in groups also varies greatly from individuals when it comes to 
risky decisions, which could mean either opting for the riskier choices or more caution and 
moderation (Lightle et al., 2006). Lastly, Argote et al. have found that “decision bias depends 
on the expertise of a group member and the extent to which the member is integrated into the 
group” (2003, p. 574).  
 
It could be argued that behavior control (also known as “structural” or “bureaucratic” control) 
is the opposite of normative control. Its regulatory function is applied via centralization and 
formalization (Cardinal, 2001, p. 24). Yang et al. define formal control as a “regulatory 
process by which the elements of a system are made more predictable through the 
establishment of standards in the pursuit of some desired objective or state” (2011, p. 87). 
Yang et al. state that its features include “impersonal, lawful and institutionalized control 
mechanisms” (Yang et al., 2011, p. 87). These structural mechanisms will most likely lead to 
stability in the company.  Adler & Borys add to the understanding of formalization by 
interpreting it as “the extent of written rules, procedures and instructions” (1996, p. 62), thus 
emphasizing the codification of the organizational procedures and methods of coordinating a 
company. 
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2.3 Organizational learning and knowledge management 
 
2.3.1 Definitions of organizational learning and knowledge management  
As stated before, the rich body of literature concerning organizational learning and knowledge 
management is both inconsistent as well as widely applied across various disciplines 
(Spender, 1996). 
Fiol and Lyles understand organizational learning as “the growing insights and successful 
restructurings of organizational problems by individuals reflected in the structural elements 
and outcomes of the organization itself” (1985, p. 803), thus emphasizing the role that 
individuals play in the performance of an organization as individuals recognize problems by 
their evolving understanding. Naturally, these two aspects that are inherent to organizational 
learning do not occur simultaneously, which, according to Fiol and Lyles (1985), makes it 
interesting to develop further insight in the dynamics that shape it.  
Huber (1991) connects organizational learning to strategy, stating that organizational learning 
allows organizations to establish an organizational understanding and interpretation of their 
environment. The resulting cognitive systems and memories are developed and shared by 
members of the organization; hereafter organizations can start assessing viable strategies 
(Huber, 1991).  
Antonacopoulou underlines that individuals contribute to the overall organizational learning: 
interpreting learning as “the liberation of knowledge through learning and self-questioning” 
(2006, p. 460).  
There is interdependency between knowledge, learning and memory and this touches upon the 
roots of the confusion in the rich body of literature: it is imperative to understand 
organizational knowledge, learning and memory as interrelated parts of one and the same 
system (Spender, 1996). Spender argues that knowledge is more about the practice of 
intervening adequately, explaining that organizations should then be seen “as systems of 
purposive activity” (1996, p. 64). He also cautions that it would be a misunderstanding to 
have a narrow concept of knowledge, as it must be understood through the processes of its 
discovery and the process that leads to the application of it (Spender, 1996). Grant 
understands organizational knowledge as the individual creation of knowledge and relates that 
to the role companies have in appropriating that knowledge to the manufacturing of goods 
and/ or providing of services (1996, p. 112).  
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Our definition of organizational learning is: “the successful coordination of the creation, 
location and transfer of knowledge – which is the result of interaction between individuals 
and as such will impact the organizational structure – that holds the potential to contribute to 
the identification of new opportunities which leads to enhanced competitive advantage and 
therefore, increased organizational performance” 
 
Knowledge management can be understood as the capability of an organization to acquire, 
converse and apply the organizational learnings. These three processes thus ultimately refer to 
the development and use of knowledge within a company (Liao & Wu, 2010). Knowledge 
management is essential to develop learning abilities. The need to translate organizational 
learning is crucial, as knowledge is instrumental in the development of new products and 
processes. As the external environment is characterized by uncertainty and rising levels of 
competition, it is imperative that businesses must keep learning to preserve their 
competitiveness (Liao & Wu, 2010). Liao and Wu’s (2010) research concludes that 
knowledge management affects organizational learning positively. 
 
2.3.2 Relevance of OL and KM in innovation  
The body of literature on organizational learning and knowledge management has flourished 
over the last decades (Argote et al., 2003; Gold et al., 2001). This might explain why the 
nature of these two concepts is highly differentiated and applied to various disciplinary 
perspectives. This discrepancy makes its integration questionable, since this shows how one 
definition of organizational learning is ambiguous and it might therefore indeed be found that 
one definition of organizational learning is elusive (Argote et al., 2003; Crossan et al., 1999).  
 
However, the benefits of organizational learning and knowledge management are evident and 
research underlines the importance of these concepts. It has been found that organizational 
learning enhances the innovative capability of companies: in leveraging the existing 
knowledge and creating new knowledge, this enables them to position themselves 
advantageously in the markets in which they operate (Liao & Wu, 2010; Skerlavaj et al., 
2010). Indeed, various authors have identified that in creating, capturing and locating 
organizational knowledge, companies will have a comparative advantage (Gold et al., 2001; 
Nonaka et al., 2000; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). 
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In addition, knowledge management contributes to organizational effectiveness: if learning 
increases, it is possible that more opportunities arise to create value. It is found that 
knowledge management may lead to an “improved ability to innovate, improved coordination 
of efforts, and rapid commercialization of new products” (Gold et al., 2001, p. 196). 
Simultaneously, it may also lead to an increased capability to anticipate the future and making 
companies better able to react to market changes (Gold et al., 2001). Crossan et al. have stated 
that organizational learning outcomes are the “principal means of achieving the strategic 
renewal of an enterprise” (2000, p. 522), emphasizing how organizational learning consists of 
both exploration and the exploitation of new products. 
 
2.3.3 Organizational learning: a description of the process 
Crossan et al. have created a framework that describes four general processes through which 
organizational learning transpires. In their development, they emphasize three features: firstly, 
organizational learning is multilevel, combining individual, group and organizational levels of 
analysis; secondly, it is dynamic which links these three levels with specific mechanisms and 
thirdly; the processes include intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing 
(Crossan et al., 1999). Crossan et al. (1999) state that learning starts at the individual level 
which will lead to group learning and will ultimately end up becoming organizational 
learning. The argument is that learning from individuals will spillover to groups and that this 
learning will be institutionalized as it becomes rooted in systems, structures, procedures and 
strategy; after all, “complex organizations are more than ad hoc communities or collections of 
individuals. Relationships become structured and some of the individual learning and shared 
understandings developed by groups become institutionalized as organization artifacts” 
(Crossan et al., 2000, p. 524). It is found that individuals use intuition (recognizing of a 
pattern or possibility, which are inherent to personal experience) and interpretation (refining 
and developing intuitive insights). The latter may also take place at the group level, where 
integration will occur: shared understandings and mutual adjustment are then created so that 
synchronized action can be taken (Crossan et al., 1999). As stated, institutionalization will 
then occur: the rules and routines that are created are exogenous to the individual; yet all are 
affected by it and all are responsible for creating these rules and routines (Crossan et al., 
1999).  
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Lawrence et al. (2005) attempt to build on the research of Crossan et al., by arguing that their 
framework of interpreting the dynamics of organizational learning is incomplete, since the 
influence of power is lacking in the interpretation of knowledge. It is explained that 
interpretations and methods of reasoning will captivate coworkers and this will encourage 
cooperative action. Therefore, it is argued that forms of power are inherent in the process of 
interpreting and integrating new ideas. Power and influence will affect the behavior, and 
perception of individuals (Lawrence et al., 2005).  
 
The interpretation of new ideas is political as this social process where people negotiate 
meaning occurs in an environment that favors particular interpretations and disapproves 
others. In this scenario, employees might take advantage of this uncertainty and use political 
strategies to advocate their ideas. Lawrence et al. think that influence is the most important 
form of power, explaining that there is “a wide range of tactics, including moral suasion, 
negotiation, persuasion, integration, and exchange” (2005, p. 184). They estimate it likely that 
influence occurs in informal networks, whereas force is more likely to occur in formal 
organizational hierarchies (Lawrence et al., 2005). 
 
2.3.4 The nature of knowledge: explicit & tacit knowledge 
It has been found that there are two types of knowledge: explicit and tacit. Explicit knowledge 
can be conveyed in formal and systematic language and is therefore easier to share (examples 
are manuals, the storage of data etc.) making it evident how explicit knowledge is easily 
processed and accessed by people in the organization. Tacit knowledge on the other hand, is 
“deeply rooted in action, procedures, routines, commitment, ideals, values and emotions” 
(Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 7). Polanyi (1966) states that all knowledge has tacit knowledge, as 
individuals are responding to qualities of the external environment by using internal 
processes. He argues that we cannot have explicit knowledge of unknown things; therefore, an 
explicit justification rooted in science is lacking: yet, when we become aware of a similar 
problem we have encountered before, we can feel sure that there are hidden implications of 
the problem we have found, as we have experienced this before: and this experience did have 
an explicit justification because it was known (Polanyi, 1966). It makes sense that tacit 
knowledge can therefore complicate organizational performance, considering that it 
continually impacts people. This can be seen as a result of the creation and the nature of tacit 
knowledge, as it is created through “the interactions amongst individuals or between 
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individuals and their environment” (Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 8). It can be seen how tacit 
knowledge complicates innovation, especially when it is a more radical idea: the more radical 
nature with less known attributes that come with it makes it harder to foresee needs and 
interactions in advance. Instead, individuals rely on their own ideas about the new product or 
process when making a decision to judge innovation (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). It is found 
that expertise is a part of tacit knowledge and that this contributes significantly to the 
competitive capability of a company in terms of organizational knowledge. As individuals 
learn and grow, and since each individual is unique in connecting patterns from both explicit 
knowledge and their experience, it is rather challenging to reflect this combined knowledge in 
an explicit, objectified way (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). Fahey & Prusak argue that tacit 
knowledge, which they define as the “body of perspectives […], perceptions […], beliefs […] 
and values […]” (1998, p. 268), are also the means by which explicit knowledge is captured 
and assimilated: tacit knowledge shapes and influences the interpretation of explicit 
knowledge.  
Unfortunately, it has been found that tacit knowledge is more difficult to transfer than explicit 
(or codified) knowledge (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Gold et al. therefore emphasize that 
employees should have the ability to engage in networks “to facilitate solutions to new or 
existing problems and to generate and share knowledge” (2001, p. 189).  It is found that in 
doing so, explicit knowledge could be internalized and become tacit knowledge. Via 
internalization, explicit knowledge is then created and shared through the organization: then, 
it becomes tacit knowledge again (Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 10). 
 
2.3.5 Informal network structure and knowledge transfer 
As the case company is characterized by informal structures, we would like to understand 
organizational learning on the group level. Knowledge can be transferred through a variety of 
mechanisms, one of which is the network structure that is present in a company. Research has 
underlined the relationship between network structures and the effect that its nature has on 
organizational performance: people on opposite ends of their roles have access to distinct 
knowledge and information. Networks then bring together various knowledge sources which 
can be shared by others: this collaboration of personal experience will enhance learning 
(Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Reagans and McEvily (2003) state that the network structure 
and the strength hereof are two different concepts and should therefore be researched 
separately to identify the effects of each. This is confirmed by Balkundi and Harrison (2006), 
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who explain that the structure is the pattern of connection, which determines what knowledge 
will move throughout the network. The strength of networks refers to the density of the 
relationships and it will thus reflect to what extent the ties of the relationships are interrelated 
(Balkundi & Harrison, 2006). The difference between formal and informal networks is the 
voluntary nature; in addition, informal networks operate through unofficial channels which 
allow people to bypass formal procedures. Therefore, the information flow and the power this 
holds might move in a different direction than the company had in mind (McGuire, 2002). 
Indeed, Dougherty & Hardy (1996) found that employees, who are undertaking innovative 
activities, see networking as an ideal means of accessing resources and creating strategic 
meaning for their proposed innovation. However, connections made are also vulnerable, as 
action depends on the initiatives of incumbents in the company rather than on organization-
wide systems. It can be seen how this endangers innovative activities. Whereas individuals 
can draw on their own networks and reputations, this might not be enough to get a particular 
sales force to accept a new concept: two factors that work against the innovator could be their 
absence of tenure or isolation in the company (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). 
 
2.4 Integration of FEI, Normative Control & Organizational Learning 
 
As stated, we will look at how high levels of normative control affect organizational learning 
and the decision-making at the Front End of Innovation. We will therefore provide an 
understanding of how these concepts are related to each other.   
 
Actions that take place in the front end are characterized by ad hoc decision-making and high 
degrees of complexity and uncertainty (Florén & Frishammar, 2012). It is found that it is 
imperative that flexibility and firmness is to be balanced, though this is rather challenging 
because companies risk that they incorrectly accept unsuitable or decline fitting ideas 
(Reinertsen, 1999; Tatikonda & Rosenthal, 2000). The culture of a company and leadership 
play a vital role in the process where a concept is transferred to the New Product and Process 
Development. It is found that employees need some sort of control in order for the new 
concepts to be aligned with organizational objectives; though simultaneously, they must have 
freedom to exert their creative capabilities to come up with something new (Feldman, 1989). 
Without managerial control, frustration of the employees might arise and this could 
potentially slow down organizational performance in various ways.  
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However, the management of companies struggles with control and coordination issues and 
use both formal and informal control mechanisms (Welch & Welch, 2006). Culture is found 
to be influential in the innovation process, including in the FEI process of idea generation, and 
normative control is found to unite a company by commitment to a shared goal where 
organizational behavior is created by and a result of shared values (Spender, 1996). In 
general, culture is conductive to a mechanism that transfers information, knowledge, 
processes, resources and people (Spender, 1996). Yet, where normative control does set goals, 
it exerts low levels of formal control as the essential component here is that normative 
systems designate appropriate ways to pursue them and trust their own employees to act in the 
best interests of the company (Barley & Kunda, 1992). Therefore, it can be seen how this 
form of control stands at odds with the FEI, where decisions need to be made, which 
necessitates a coordination of knowledge and a setting of goals for the innovation department. 
As stated, the nature of normative control is quite unstructured and this translates to confusion 
and a lack of vision which troubles the front end of innovation. In addition it is also found that 
group decisions fail to make sense of available information because personal information 
guides the contribution to the overall knowledge that is created to come to a decision, and one 
cannot include all personal information (Lightle et al., 2009). Given this argument plus the 
notion that normative control allows for considerable freedom, it can be seen how managers 
can rely on tacit knowledge and intuition to evaluate ideas. However, according to Forde and 
Fox, this could be problematic as “the human brain is wired to apply familiar patterns into 
new situations, even when this is inappropriate” (2016, p. 49).  It follows that once this 
occurs, a bias is formed which could interfere with how new information is assimilated. New 
information will be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the beliefs the individual has 
created a long time ago (Forde & Fox, 2016).   
 
As the company culture impacts the organizational activity by underlining ideational and 
normative elements; the structures hereof being reproduced through interactions and meaning 
given to it by employees; one can understand what components of organizational learning 
occur and how this comes to be about. Simultaneously, as organizational learning leads to 
organizational effectiveness, it could be argued that it might influence the levels of control 
that are found in the company; after all, it is found that this is continuously altered, shaped, 
reinforced or changed. Antonacopoulou (2006) also found that learning of individuals will 
ultimately move into collective practices, thus relocating the knowledge at a community 
group level which has certain structures in their interaction in its own right. Brown and 
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Duguid argued that communities that operate within the boundaries of a company are seen as 
the core factor that brings innovative views into an organization. Brown & Duguid (1991) 
argued that innovative energy can be understood by the organizational structures of a 
company which will determine how these communities are linked to each other: whereas 
communities must be awarded considerable autonomy, they should also be linked together in 
order for mutual understanding and shared learning experiences to occur. Indeed, should the 
culture be more formalized, less communication occurs which decreases the chance of 
learning (Kyriazis et al., 2017). Interestingly, tacit knowledge is rooted in procedures, 
routines, ideals, values and emotions and is created through the interactions amongst 
individuals (Nonaka et al., 2000). This finds resonance with the mechanisms of normative 
control which is also not explicit in its nature and operates in the same way. Both normative 
levels of control and organizational learning are assumed to consist of routines that will 
eventually become embedded in a company. However, normative control sets the method of 
how employees are to act, whereas organizational learning relates to what knowledge is 
eventually being spread throughout the company.  
 
Normative control relates to organizational learning in the sense that the former explains how 
and if organizational learning occurs in a company: organizational structure is a key 
determinant in leveraging knowledge (Gold et al., 2001). Turner and Makhija beautifully 
underline how control and the ability to manage knowledge play an integral role: firstly, 
control mechanisms in their own right have inherent information processing properties – 
regardless of whether these mechanisms consist of norms, routines or coordination 
mechanisms – will mandate the relationships between individuals and groups (Turner & 
Makhija, 2006). Naturally, it follows that these relationships influence how information is 
shared and knowledge is integrated in the firm. Secondly, controls generate stimuli for 
employees to act in a synchronized way so that organizational objectives will be reached 
(Turner & Makhija, 2006). In setting socially determined expectations for behavior, 
characterized by an emphasis on collective responsibility which in its own right underlines the 
importance of uniformity and cooperation, it can be seen how this could influence the 
direction that organizational learning takes, which will be the aggregate of personal opinions 
and actions (Gold et al., 2001). It is found that more organizational learning occurs when 
more departments develop uniform understandings of the various interpretations that other 
departments hold (Huber, 1991). Since normative control allows for considerable freedom to 
act and as open communication in collaborative relationships in networks increase knowledge 
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which is beneficial in coping with the highly unpredictable nature of the innovation process, it 
can be seen that normative control contributes to organizational learning (Kyriazis et al., 
2017). However, since normative control lacks formalization, it could be seen how knowledge 
regarding the know-how and new information will not be embedded in the organization. Yet, 
building and sustaining the sources of ideas is as important as managing the FEI since it 
increases the organization’s ability to be prepared for challenges in the future. Therefore, 
managers at all levels need to understand how knowledge is accessed, channeled and used 
(Kim & Wilemon, 2002). As management influences the ability to create, retain or transfer 
knowledge, it would be interesting to see how the lack of control herein affects the creation 
and transfer of organizational learning.  
 
The FEI of innovation is then related to organizational learning, as knowledge is instrumental 
in the development of new products or processes. It is found that due to the volatile external 
environment, characterized by uncertainty and increasing competition, companies must learn 
to keep its competitiveness. As more formalized project selection and resource allocation in 
the FEI is difficult due to the limited information and understanding, it can be seen how 
organizational learning and knowledge transfer are to benefit the FEI and will contribute to an 
improved decision-making stage (Koen et al., 2001). Indeed, it has been found that decision-
making clarity contributes to more knowledge creation which will in turn increase effective 
performance in the FEI overall (Kim & Wilemon, 2002). As stated, this paper emphasizes to 
what extent organizational learning occurs in the FEI and how that impacts the decision stage. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research approach and design 
 
Our research is based on a single case study, as we are “concerned with the complexity and 
particular nature of the case in question.” (Bryman and Bell, 2011 p. 59). In this research, we 
are interested in the interactions between individuals and groups and the outcomes of these 
interactions, therefore adopting a constructionist ontological position. Thereby we want to 
gain an understanding of these dynamics and their effects on the people involved in this social 
setting, hence taking up an interpretivist position.  We conduct inductive research as we are 
not pursuing to test an existing theory, but generate a new one (Bryman and Bell, 2011). All 
these three criteria, as well as the use of a case study design and the fact that we work with 
words rather than numbers, characterize the qualitative nature of this research paper (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). The challenge with qualitative, inductive research is to substantiate your 
findings and conclude these in a new emergent theory. The most widely applied framework 
for analyzing qualitative research is grounded theory. Grounded theory highlights that the 
theory qualitative researchers arrived at is “derived from data, systematically gathered and 
analysed through the research process” (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.576). To achieve this level 
of corroboration, different methods for analysis are at hand: Bettis et al. (2015) explicate 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) by Ragin, the Eisenhardt method and the Gioia 
method in detail, showcasing how especially the Gioia method can be used to build a dynamic 
inductive model with clear ties to its original data structure. 
 
The case company was introduced in chapter 1.5, and it is through its innovation department 
(part of the technology division) and different actors from the management team that are part 
of the steering committee (SC, decision-makers to innovation department’s concepts) that we 
will explore the dynamics between high level of normative control and organizational 
learning and its effects on the decision-making process. 
To answer our research question namely: “How do high levels of normative control affect 
organizational learning and the decision-making stage at the Front End of the Innovation 
Process to the NPPD in a growing company?” we will use observations and informal 
interviews, existing theories and research and semi-structured interviews with the innovation 
department and steering committee members to gather data. Why and how we apply this 
research approach will be explained in 3.2 in more detail. 
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3.2 Data collection methods 
 
As we are interested in contemplating on the dynamic between innovation, control and on the 
other hand: organizational learning, we found semi-structured interviews the best method to 
provide us insight into these concepts and dynamics. The semi-structured interviews will offer 
more personal and both retrospective and real time insights of the people that are part of the 
dynamic relationship we want to investigate, additionally giving our research a longitudinal 
character by taking participants tenure at the case company into account (Gioia et al., 2013). 
To pursue semi-structured interviewing, an interview guide (appendix 1 and 2) needs to be 
drafted that covers the topics we want to investigate, however leaving leeway to be responsive 
to the interviewee’s input to ask further if an interesting new path opens up or change the 
order of questions to add fluidity to the course of the conversation. 
We initially started with informal talks with our mentor and individuals in the innovation 
department and took field notes of observations we made to obtain a better understanding of 
the problems the department is experiencing.  
 
We are at risk of ‘going native’ within our research as we are immersed in the same social 
setting as the people we studied for five months (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Nevertheless, by 
being mindful of this possibility we introduced the role of a “devil’s advocate” (Gioia et al., 
2013, p. 19): one person of the team taking on an outsider, or passive, perspective during the 
interviews and subsequent analyses to continuously scrutinize assumptions and interpretations 
made by the other team member. 
 
3.2.1 Observations and informal interviews 
The initial stage of data collection comprised observations made at the company and informal 
interviews with various employees which were recorded with field notes as is suggested by 
Bryman and Bell (2011). This orientation phase was crucial for us to pinpoint interesting 
phenomena and areas of interest that had the potential to be more thoroughly investigated, 
aiding us in formalizing a first tentative research question and starting the formal data 
gathering process explained in the following paragraphs.  
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3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
 
3.2.2.1 Interviewee selection  
With the sense of direction gained via observations and informal interviews, we were able to 
purposively choose interviewees, applying theoretical sampling, whereby “the process of data 
collection is controlled by emerging theory” (Bryman and Bell, 2011) and ended by 
theoretical saturation, when an additional interviewee would not add more or better insights 
(ibid.). Our interviewee selection is divided in two different groups (figure 3). The first group 
is the innovation team working at the front end of innovation. Being part of the innovation 
department is one selection criterion, as well as having participated in Steering Committee 
meetings. Seven people in total have been interviewed. 
The second group is the official Steering Committee assigned to the innovation group, the 
ones responsible for selecting the ideas and concepts to enter the formal NPPD process. The 
only selection criterion is being a member of this particular Steering Committee. The six 
members that were interviewed in total are senior or mid-level managers. 
 
1st Group innovation 
department 
Position Date Tenure 
Interviewee 1 Engineer 05.04.2017 - 
Interviewee 2 Engineer 05.04.2017 - 
Interviewee 3 Engineer 05.04.2017 - 
Interviewee 4 Senior engineer 05.04.2017 + 
Interviewee 5 Project manager 06.04.2017 + 
Interviewee 6 Engineering manager 06.04.2017 + 
Interviewee 7 Engineer 06.04.2017 + 
2nd Group SC Position Date  
SC 1 VP of the R&D organization 21.02.2017 + 
SC 2 Director System & Services 21.02.2017 + 
SC 3 R&D Director Technologies 23.02.2017 + 
SC 4 Director Product Management 03.03.2017 + 
SC 5 Chief Technology Officer 07.03.2017 + 
SC 6 Advisor to New Business  21.03.2017 + 
Figure 3: Selected Interviewees 
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These participants were selected on the basis of each having a role to play in the innovation 
process, be it at the front end or at the decision-making stage. Thus we can gather data from 
all involved perspectives and make a well-rounded statement. The information on tenure 
added to figure 3 is used to accentuate the longitudinal aspect of this case, as employees 
working at the case company for more than six years have experienced the significant growth 
of the company in terms of headcount and growing complexity in structure (see chapter 1.5). 
This aspect is important to highlight, as the company’s growth in recent years was a frequent 
issue that arose in the informal interviews and therefore was made part of the interview guide. 
To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, a simple + in the figure indicates tenure for six 
or more years, a – shorter tenure than six years.  
 
3.2.2.2 Interview preparations and ethical concerns 
Drawing up the interview guide, we are aware of the need to watch our phrasing as to probe, 
but not to put words in the interviewees’ mouths. The questions will leave enough space for 
the interviewees to elaborate on their opinion or bring up new aspects entirely. The interview 
guide starts out with general questions about the position and tenure of the interview subject. 
Information on these topics help us understand how immersed the subject is in the company 
culture and politics, but also, especially when interviewing the management (middle and 
senior) what kind of mandate (ergo scope of power) the interviewee has and how he/she uses 
it. The other questions are about the innovation process in the innovation department and how 
they perceive it and their role in it respectively. This sheds light on their perceptions and level 
of awareness for different inherent problems in the process. These questions will also capture 
individuals understanding of terms like innovation and the purpose of the innovation 
department. A so-called ‘doorknob question’ is incorporated at the end as the interviewee then 
tends to be more at ease and has a rapport established with the interviewers. This final 
question prompts the interviewee to voice their own opinion, give a directive towards the 
research and gives them the chance to raise an issue that might have been overlooked or not 
covered during the interview (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
For the SC members, the interview guide additionally includes questions on their preparation 
for meetings, decision-making and its basis, as well as an ad hoc comparison of two concepts, 
one that was rejected and one that was accepted by them in the past. Thereby testing the 
previous statements about their decision-making basis (criteria etc.) and also testing their 
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memory. This is important, as the knowledge about rejected or pending concepts is not stored 
digitally, but put on a poster at the innovation office. This knowledge is therefore mostly tacit 
with the people who came in contact with it and is not fully codified and accessible to others. 
The interviews were conducted in meeting rooms removed from the interviewees’ respective 
departments to ensure privacy and for people to be able to voice their opinion freely and 
undisturbed as Bryman and Bell (2011) propose. All interviewees were asked in advance if 
they consent to recording the interview, which they agreed upon after being ensured that they 
would be anonymized. We secured the interviewees’ anonymity by coding the department’s 
name in the interview guide, the quotes and the written text  as [innovation department], 
coding the interviewees’ names by ciphering them in a numerical fashion [interviewee 1, 
interviewee 2] and referring to the company not by name but either by case company or 
[COMPANY]. We refrained from giving the interviewees in-depth information about the 
research areas to prevent bias and too much preparation in answering our questions. Rather, 
the broad research aim was explained about investigating the innovation process at the case 
company so the decision to partake could still be made on informed consent (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). 
 
 
3.3 Data analysis using the Gioia method 
 
The data gathered from the semi-structured interviews will be analyzed using the Gioia 
method, a part of grounded theory (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The Gioia method balances the 
conflicting “need to develop new concepts inductively while meeting the high standards for 
rigor demanded by our top journals” (Gioia et al., 2013, page 17). Gioia et al. (2013) plead a 
case for semi-ignorance in collecting and analyzing data as to alleviate confirmation bias that 
might originate from too much prior knowledge on certain subjects as this could prevent the 
emergence and fair treatment of new and previously unrelated concepts and connections. 
Adhering to this recommendation, we kept the initial theoretical research basic and then 
started iterating between literature and analysis for aggregating the dimensions, also aided by 
the devil’s advocate role introduced in 3.2. 
 
Proceedings according to Gioia are as follows: first, we use transcripts of recorded interviews, 
and highlight interesting and relevant statements (1st order concepts). Secondly, we then 
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group those statements by developing themes and use the interviewee’s own language to truly 
capture their experience (2nd order themes). After that, we will aggregate those themes 
further into dimensions, this time in our own words. Figure 4 depicts the resulting data 
structure exemplary after Gioia et al. (2013, page 21): 
 
Figure 4: Data structure by Gioia et al. (2013) 
 
Then, we find the aggregated dimensions and see how they relate to each other. This, we will 
do separately for the two groups (SC and innovation department), creating a data structure for 
each group and explain our findings in a narrative saturated with exemplary quotes from the 
informants (Gioia et al., 2013). Then again, we will look for similarities and differences in the 
second order themes and the aggregated dimensions comparing both groups. Then we can 
move from a static picture of themes and dimensions into the quest of developing a dynamic 
framework of both groups within and towards each other. 
 
3.4 Validity, Replicability and Reliability 
 
Qualitative research using a single case study design is always hard to adapt to reliability, 
replicability and validity measures used in quantitative research, as the data gathered in 
qualitative research is usually not numerical in nature. Bryman and Bell (2011) offers an 
overview for different criteria that can be used to emulate quantitative validity, replicability 
and reliability criteria.  
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To ensure validity of the study, we use the triangulation method, whereby we are “using more 
than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena” (ibid.), in our case, 
interviews with two different interest groups: employees in the innovation department and 
middle/senior managers as the decision-makers. This way, we cross-check the information we 
gathered from one group of respondents with the other and validate information gathered 
initially via observations, informal interviews and theoretical research. Still, triangulation in 
qualitative research alone is not enough to claim internal validity. Mays and Pope (2000) 
suggest more ways to improve validity additional to triangulation, like ‘reflexivity’, ‘clear 
exposition of methods of data collection and analysis’ and ‘fair dealing’. Reflexivity is used to 
reflect on how the “researcher and the research process have shaped the collected data, 
including the role of prior assumptions and experience” (Mays and Pope, 2000, p.51). This 
entails revealing possible biases, for example in regards to the closeness of researcher and the 
people being interviewed. This point was addressed in 3.2, explaining the risk of ‘going 
native’ and the consequently introduction of the role of devil’s advocate. Delivering a 
transparent account of how the data for this paper was collected and analyzed in using the 
Gioia method (see 3.2) addresses the validation technique of ‘clear exposition of methods of 
data collection’. We further validate our findings by giving our research topic a ‘fair dealing’ 
as coined by Mays and Pope (2000), by interviewing in total 13 people, divided in two 
different groups with different perspectives as to give the research depth and diverse 
viewpoints.  
By providing the interview guides used in the appendix, imparting a clear account of the 
application of the Gioia method by showing and explaining data structure and model building, 
this research can be replicable to further studies.  
To meet the criterion of internal reliability, inter-observer consistency is applied (Bryman and 
Bell, 2014), which again requires the critical scrutinizing of assumptions made and 
dimensions aggregated by both team members. 
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4. FINDINGS 
 
In chapter 3, the Gioia method approach was explained, as well as the two groups of people 
we interviewed to answer our research question: “How do high levels of normative control 
affect organizational learning and the decision-making stage at the Front End of the 
Innovation Process to the NPPD in a growing company?” 
In the following subchapters, the emerging data structure will be shown and explained from 
the innovation department representing people innovating at the Front End of Innovation, 
giving a bottom-up perspective on the research question on the one hand, and the Steering 
Committee a top-down perspective on the other hand, representing the decision-makers in the 
innovation process according to the dimensions that emerged during the research. Both data 
structures will be compared in terms of similar dimensions and the emergent concepts will 
then be synthesized to build a model (Gioia et al., 2013), explaining the different dynamics 
caused by normative control. Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 discuss the results and 5.3 links them 
back to literature. In paragraph 5.4, a generalized model is introduced based on our findings 
and limitations to this research are summarized. 
 
4.1 First dimension: Normative control 
The concept of normative control was explained in detail in chapter 2.2.1 and defined as: 
“The informal, value-driven method of coordination of employee activity which allows 
considerable autonomy regarding the objectives to act on, but sets normative boundaries of 
employee behavior regarding the way they act to achieve those objectives”. The first 
aggregated dimension found in both interview groups was normative control, as it is prevalent 
in the company on a high level and manifested in the company culture and values. It 
peremeates every decision, attitude and work step taken by employees as well as managers. 
4.1.1 Normative control innovation department  
When innovation department members were talking about the work and the company, they 
emphasized how much they value the freedom and flexibility they have at work, which 
encourages them to be creative and innovative and shows the trust of the company in 
employees’ loyalty and the personal responsibility that each one would work in the 
company’s best interest, seeing the company as a whole as a collective, where the consensus 
of the majority over a decision is favored compared to individual power trips. This is due to 
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the openness and informality of the firm with its flat hierarchy and open-door policy. Figure 5 
displays the data structure. 
Interviewee 3 explained it as follows:“I don't know how to describe it, but the social 
environment here with an open-door policy, you can go talk to people, the managers are 
accessible and so on, it's good!” 
These themes fit into the definition of normative control introduced in chapter 2.2 and 
therefore, normative control is the name of the aggregated dimension.  
Figure 5: Data structure innovation department – Normative control  
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4.1.2 Normative control SC  
In explaining how the trust in other people works and what the effects thereof are, it was 
brought up that there is a large individual freedom to act, where employees should not just 
obey managers. It is found that in the culture of Axis, you cannot give people orders. As it is 
found that employees have the responsibility to change and drive things, it follows that they 
have the freedom to create their own work. It can be seen how the innovation department has 
personal responsibility. This individual freedom to act and personal responsibility can be seen 
to resonate in what normative control entails. The finding that openness fosters innovation 
and that SC members hold an aversion to formal processes only adds to that: the overall 
finding is that informal, open processes foster innovation. Simultaneously, it follows that people 
ignore decisions which leads to resurfacing ideas of the innovation department. The previously 
mentioned factors combined with these findings can be seen that people continue to work 
despite negative feedback. Since these dimensions are consistent with normative control, the 
resulting aggregate dimension is therefore termed as normative control. Interviewee 1 phrased 
it as: “You don't need too much of those formal decisions if you have a sort of responsibility, 
you can drive things and you don't have to push everything for decision on my level for 
example.” 
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Figure 6: Data structure SC –Normative control 
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4.2 Second dimension: Low level of formalization 
Both groups mention the lack of formalized processes and the disinclination of making use of 
mandates. So contrary to the high levels of normative control found during the research, a 
near absence of formal control in the case company has been identified. The ubiquitous 
normative control seems to be hampering formalization. 
4.2.1 Low level of formalization innovation department 
When asked about the scope of their work, the interviewees found it difficult to answer as 
their work objectives for them are unclear as there are also no formal processes in place that 
could help as a guide.  Interviewee 4 described his confusion as: “Sometimes we were 
supposed to try everything. Sometimes we are more supposed to focus on certain details. 
Sometimes we should take it further to make a complete product; sometimes you need one 
more quick tests and just write a poster about it”  
The managers of the Steering Committee offer not much support or real steering from their 
side to help the concepts and ideas to enter the commercialization phase. Even if they as 
partly senior managers would have the power to delegate work, they are shying away from 
taking firm decisions. The innovation department therefore does not always respect those 
decisions, and keep on working on concepts they believe in, as there are no repercussions 
feared. This highlights the low level of formal control prevalent in the case company (figure 
7). 
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Figure 7: Data structure innovation department - Low level of formalization 
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4.2.2 Low level of formalization SC 
Consistent with normative control, it is found that there is relative freedom in the case 
company. There are open doors to help; hence there are no follow-ups that are formalized: it 
is people’s own responsibility to ask for support. It can be seen how the SC holds a reliance 
on employees to come forward when in need. Therefore, it can be understood that the SC 
holds no detail in steering and has no idea what people are doing, which translate to no clear 
guidance. This can be understood in the light of no specific mandate that is allocated to 
people and an unclear delegation of authority. In addition, there is a lack of strategy, no clear 
vision and a fuzzy scope of role. This translates to an unclear vision/strategy. Naturally, this 
can be understood as there are no clear decisions where it is also up to the individuals to 
interpret decisions. It follows that the results of decision-making are unclear. These aspects 
can be seen to hold low levels of formalization, which could be problematic. SC interviewee 5 
stated that: “You have to train people to walk around and ask”, which characterizes the low 
level of formalization. 
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Figure 8: Data structure SC– Low level of formalization 
 
 
52 
 
4.3 Third dimension: Political behavior 
In this section, political behavior has been identified as an outcome of the previously 
mentioned low levels of formalization and high levels of normative control. Working via an 
informal network is decisive in getting information and having a better chance to getting a 
concept accepted. 
4.3.1 Political behavior innovation department 
Building on the flat and open company culture and informality shown in the first dimension, 
people in the innovation department expressed the pivotal role of their informal network 
within the company to get information and lobby ideas to create a critical mass for them and 
create word-of-mouth and interest to tip the odds in their favor at the later official decision-
making meetings or an early sell-in by product managers. The innovation department 
therefore puts effort into internal publicity, informing the company about their concepts via 
yearly booklets or frequent exhibitions and informal coffee meetings onsite. All this 
politicking, or lobbying is seen by the members as crucial to the acceptance of their ideas and 
they agree that the more you engage in this political behavior and networking, the better 
chances you give your ideas. I knew quite a lot of people around [COMPANY]. Interviewee 7 
phrased it as: “And you have a big network to sell it in. I think that was the most important 
thing for me to get your network with people to ask about, to sell in to, and that was the 
biggest thing” 
This situation therefore favors employees with a longer tenure at the company, as they were 
able to grow their network over a longer time but also were aided by the fact that in the early 
days the company was much smaller (figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Data structure innovation department - Political behavior 
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4.3.2 Political behavior SC 
It can be seen how political behavior is found to be the means by which processes in the 
[innovation department] are characterized. The SC found that it is close to mandatory that 
employees need to negotiate internally to get support and that they need to convince 
management and sell-in to people. It could be seen how this is facilitated by the lack of 
formalization discussed earlier. Instead, networks and connections are crucial, as it is found 
that you learn from other people, which is why it follows that network is more important than 
positions. Therefore, it can be seen how connecting the right people together is pivotal in the 
process as well: it has been found that you need to involve the right people, in order to form 
the right team to drive projects. SC interviewee 2 stated it as follows: “Who's doing what? If 
we really do change, there's a lot of those questions. And of course, I don't know if you've 
studied it, but all change is a shift of power. Which means, there is always somebody that 
poses to the change.” 
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Figure 10: Data structure SC - Political behavior 
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4.4 Fourth dimension: Complexity of company 
In chapter 1.5, the growing complexity of the case company has been introduced by 
highlighting the increasing headcount of employees and the added intricacy of more 
departments locally and overseas. Interviewees in both groups voiced their concerns about the 
impact the complexity has on the informal network structure and on the decreasing risk-taking 
and agility properties of the company. As most of the interviewees have a long tenure within 
the case company, the changes in structure and size are apparent to them and it is seen how 
the complexity of the company has regulating properties when it comes to control. 
 
4.4.1 Complexity of company innovation department 
The company is also perceived as not taking risks and playing it safe, which innovation 
department members attribute to the bigger size of the case company nowadays. Incumbent 
inertia set in and the firm itself is less agile and struggling to adapt to its own volume, as 
interviewee 5 put it: 
“I think the inertia of the company has become much much bigger, we sometimes feels that  
[COMPANY], takes the safe way; we are playing not to loose, and everything that is more 
risky, more speculative, we tend to send this to someone else.”  
The crucial aspect of networking is jeopardized by the complexity of the company (figure 11), 
making this one of the most influential factors to controlling the FEI with normative control.  
 
It is unclear when the company outgrew high levels of normative control, interviewee 6 
thinks: “I guess you lose track when you are above 100. Then you don’t really know, who’s 
working here anymore.” While interviewee 1 says: “I think it was approximately 800 more or 
less.. Now we are 1600 in  just in four years, so.. [COMPANY] has grown really fast. And the 
adaptation is not going at fast. So we are failing in many parts, in many departments are 
struggling to adapt their ways, or adapt it for enterprise company rather than a small 
company or medium sized company.” 
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Figure 11: Data structure innovation department- Complexity of company 
 
 
4.4.2 Complexity of company SC 
It has been found that  the growth of the company leads to inertia, since a growing company 
leads to slow decisions, and it is found to be challenging to keep speed up and be agile which 
marks the change that the company is going through, as it is acknowledged that in a smaller 
company there is a better overview. Instead, there is a need for synchronization, which 
typically includes to force people to synch plans and it has been found to be a challenge to 
work together and coordinate. It has been found that there are disadvantages that come with 
the size: a big company cannot handle fuzzy innovation, and in addition, there are different 
priorities due to bigger size. Therefore, it has been stated by the SC that there is a need to 
balance the job the employee is supposed to do and freedom to work and that there is a need 
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for strategy and guidelines to ensure people are working in the same direction. This translates 
to a need to balance freedom and direction. These dimensions can be seen to be located in the 
complexity of a company. Interviewee 3 described the growth of the company and how the 
current normative control mechanisms might not work as well in comparison to the past as 
follows: “It's not like ‘OK it's the same thing’ it's actually been changing a lot so I think it's 
very interesting because there a new aspects all the time. When I started we were less than 
hundred people at Axis. So if you look at how the company worked then, we had weekly 
meetings with everybody in the company. They would gather in the cafeteria and the CEO 
would talk about business stuff. Today, we are 2000-something, here in Lund I think we are 
1800 or something.” 
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Figure 12: Data structure SC – Complexity of company 
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4.5 Fifth dimension: Intuitive consensus based decision-making 
Owing to the previous four dimensions, normative control, low level of formalization, 
political behavior and complexity of the company, the decision-making is based on 
consensus, intuition and the foregoing networking activities. 
 
4.5.1 Intuitive consensus based decision-making innovation department 
FEI members do not give much credibility to the current decision-makers. They perceive the 
decisions that are made as based on gut-feeling and feel that oftentimes the Steering 
Committee judges concept wrongly as they lack knowledge for a fair judgment. The 
innovation department is not given enough time to present their ideas and concepts in their 
entirety, interviewee 2 describing his experience: “With these guys, they cannot wait twenty 
minutes. That day, you get one, two minutes and then they stop to discuss it. And then I feel I 
didn't get my message across and you understand in the discussions that they didn't really 
understand.” On top of that, SC members do not seem to take the time to prepare the 
meetings, therefore the decision-making appears to be intuitive and aimed towards consensus 
(figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Data structure innovation department - Intuitive consensus based decision-making 
 
4.5.2 Intuitive consensus based decision-making SC 
The current decision-making process on the other hand, is built around trust in other people’s 
judgments: it has been found that the SC has faith in other people’s actions and 
simultaneously holds significant trust in other people’s ideas and opinions. Therefore, it can 
be seen how there are no preparations for the meeting, since the SC has no time, do not see 
the need to prepare, and in addition,  feel prepared already as there are usually no surprises or 
they find that they can give the feedback without preparing. It can be seen how decisions are 
based on gut-feeling, thoughts and experience, which leaves room to have personal 
interpretations guide decisions. As it is found important that the majority decides, the process 
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hereof being diplomatic and consensus-seeking and characterized by a mutual view and 
common understanding, it can be seen how these factors lead to intuitive consensus based 
decision-making. SC interviewee 3 described how he informs other people by stating that “the 
gut feeling which is not only a gut feeling but it's based on a lot of knowledge and experience 
from this people I think that's needed to help PCNI to actually find their way.” 
 
Figure 14: Data structure SC- Intuitive consensus based decision-making 
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4.6 Sixth dimension: Waste of resources 
The sixth dimension encompasses the waste of resources that includes waste of time of both 
groups due to the necessary network activities and the need for consensus in decision-making 
and waste of money and manpower when people in other departments do similar or even the 
same work as there is no formal synchronization process between departments and people can 
work freely and independently without involving management. 
4.6.1 Waste of resources innovation department 
Innovation department members were complaining about wasting their time searching for 
information and support within the growing company, hindered mostly by an unstructured 
intranet and the sheer number of employees that could have the expertise needed. Interviewee 
1 describes one situation like this: “Like, yesterday, I had to contact 5 people to get the 
correct knowledge for something that is, what I had known that we have, but nobody has 
checked it out where the information actually exists. So, that took a lot of time for me, and I 
had to activate 5 or 6 people!”  
 Due to the lack of structure and clear communication, it happened that another department 
was working on the same problem as the innovation department which was discovered by 
chance and additionally, that after the hand-over of a concept to NPPD, the innovation 
department is often cut off from further supporting the implementation, sometimes leading to 
repeating ‘the same mistakes that we’ve done’ which is a waste of money and manpower. 
Generally speaking, a lot of resources are unnecessarily wasted (figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15: Data structure innovation department - Waste of resources 
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4.6.2 Waste of resources SC 
The SC has expressed that there are time-consuming daily discussions and meetings and that 
there are different offices to be able to have discussions with people, which is also indicative 
of the expanding size of the company, as well as the normative control that characterizes the 
company culture. In addition, it has been acknowledged that rejected ideas are pushed back in 
the decision-making process by the innovation department. These resurfacing ideas and time 
consuming processes can be interpreted as a waste of resources, since the lack of efficiency is 
seen to constrain fast-moving effective actions. However, rejected ideas are not always seen 
as negative. As SC interviewee 2 states: “Because, the formal one we've tested in different 
ways within Axis, and hasn't been successful. Doesn't mean that nothing good has come out of 
that, I think the PCNI-group, I'm not saying that's bad because I think it's an absolute 
necessity to have a group constantly watching new technology so we don't get surprised” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Data structure SC – Waste of resources 
 
4.7 Seventh dimension: Organizational learning 
Organizational learning has been defined in chapter 2.3 as “the coordination of the creation, 
location and transfer of knowledge – which is the result of interaction between individuals 
and as such will be impact the organizational structure – that holds the potential to contribute 
to the identification of new opportunities which leads to enhanced competitive advantage and 
therefore, increased organizational performance”. Findings during the interviews suggest 
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that due to the high levels of normative control, no formal way of acquiring or transferring 
knowledge is existent in the case company. Therefore learning at the decision-making stage 
depends on the feedback given by management and its inherent quality for employees 
working at the FEI and for the decision-makers, they learn about the new concepts prior to the 
stage via informal networking and the way they make sense of it. 
 
4.7.1 Organizational learning innovation department 
Organizational learning (figure 17) for innovation department members takes place at the 
decision-making stage through good and honest feedback provided by SC and additionally, 
the freedom and flexibility at work offers them a chance for individually looking into new 
areas of their interest and therefore supports personal development. Interviewee 4 illustrated: 
“So I like to work with things that I can't do. So now with radar, nobody knew anything about 
it so we can spend a couple of years learning how it works, starting from zero and learning. 
Maybe that’s the drive, I can learn more things. It would be too static, if I had to do this all 
the time.” 
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Figure 17: Data structure innovation department– Organizational learning 
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4.7.2 Organizational learning SC 
Regarding the organizational learning dimension, it can be seen that the SC has no knowledge 
about internal processes or where ideas come from, and lack insight in the ideation phase of 
the [innovation department]. They mentioned how the SC is not giving much feedback, and 
that the company should overall learn from feedback. This can be understood as the SC does 
not remember ideas, or at least, how they were brought up again, and the SC acknowledged 
that they are not good at storing and remembering concepts, yet it is found that “things do 
pop up, for somebody remembers”. SC interviewee 1 identified knowledge to be important, 
yet is unsure how to design a process for this: “And maybe the implementation of this is not 
the most important I think the discussions around it, ‘why did you make this decision, or why 
did you make this decision?’, that might be most important. It is very hard to document and 
keep that alive, so I haven't found a good way to solve it. So if you had a proposal I welcome 
that.” 
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Figure 18: Data structure SC – Organizational learning 
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4.8 Eighth dimension: Balance of exploitation and exploration 
 
The eigth dimension found during the analysis of the interviews was highlighted as the need 
to balance exploitation versus exploration by the management team. Where the innovation 
department wants to introduce new concepts to create value, the SC members are more 
occupied with preserving and nurturing the core business and show reluctance to accept 
innovative ideas. 
4.8.1 Balance of exploitation and exploration innovation department 
The Steering Committee members are often perceived as absent-minded and rushing from one 
meeting to the other. Their positions keep them occupied a lot with daily business, and the 
innovation department members feel that in the growing company, they have to compete for 
resources with the core business and that the innovative concepts and ideas are not prioritized. 
Interviewee 6 pointed out that: “When a company is growing it’s more difficult for the 
innovation team, it’s much harder, you have to compete with the current product range, if you 
have an income from a product line you always tend to give that more resources”.  
This characterizes the incumbent’s struggle to balance exploitation of core business and 
exploration of new business. 
 
 
Figure 19: Data structure innovation department - Balance of exploitation and exploration 
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4.8.2 Balance of exploitation and exploration SC 
SC members experience that support for innovation is more demanding as service workers 
would need to be trained on the new product, there would possibly be a need to open up a new 
sales channel to serve new customers etc. They are therefore more reluctant to allocate 
resources to prioritize innovative concepts as the risk to invest with no secure returns is high.  
 
SC interviewee 4 explained:“We need to keep them balanced there because it’s important that 
we stay competitive on our bread and butter products that really gives us the revenue, and we 
want to expand and go into new areas with the challenge products and we want to be 
innovative and come up with totally new ideas as well. But you can’t do just one. ‘Cause it 
wouldn’t work. So we need that balanced.” 
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Figure 20: Data structure SC - Balance of exploitation and exploration 
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4.9 Ninth dimension: Motivation 
The ninth dimension found during the analysis of the interviews was highlighted only by the 
innovation department members as they seem mostly affected by it: motivation. Related to the 
personal responsibility and the importance of lobbying in the case company, the employees at 
the FEI experience a challenge to stay motivated in pushing their innovative concepts 
forward, especially when they experience negative attitudes and unconstructive feedback 
during the decision-making stage. It leads to negative feelings and quite a lot of frustration, 
since it is not custom that individual success is acknowledged. The impact on motivation 
(figure 21) is therefore quite high, as interviewee 6 stated:  
“The most challenging is basically to maintain energy, to keep motivated, to put things in 
perspective, people are disappointed in some cases where they think that their concept was 
not fairly judged, or some frustration is basically to back off a little bit and see the big 
picture.” 
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Figure 21: Data structure - Motivation 
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5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 General discussion of findings 
 
It is found that the employees at the innovation department appreciate the freedom they 
experience in their role, which can be located in the trust that the Steering Committees holds: 
it is expected that you are responsible to know what is in the company’s best interests and as a 
result, it can be seen that there is no clear guidance from their part. It is mentioned that their 
culture is not consistent with giving orders and that they are not able to give feedback of a 
more determinist nature. Instead, employees need to step forward if they are in need of more 
information or guidance. The company values a community feeling, trying to maintain the 
inclusion of all relevant actors in the innovation process. This combination has proven to be 
difficult, since the Steering Committee members do not articulate their expectations clearly, 
and the prevalent freedom to act ensures that the innovation department can continue to work 
on their projects. It is difficult to strike a balance between regulating the process more by 
setting goals or delineating mandates while simultaneously allowing other opinions as other 
people have different sets of knowledge, which could potentially contribute to the overall 
performance of the company. This explains why the Steering Committee finds the decision 
making process complicated: even when it is thought a decision has been made, employees or 
the Steering Committee members themselves have to interpret afterwards what the outcome 
was and how this translates to objectives to act on.  
 
The process that occurs prior to the decision making phase can be seen as political. The 
Steering Committee finds that the innovation department needs to approach pivotal people in 
the company to acquaint them with the concept, and convince them in order to secure support. 
Both groups highlight the importance of networking activities to achieve this: it is believed by 
the Steering Committee that this guides the innovation department, since they receive 
feedback as well. However, the innovation department finds that some people in their 
department are more capable of doing this, since they have more knowledge about the 
network structures that exist in the company. There is a risk that the current innovation 
process might be stalled should this informal behavior cease to function. The Steering 
Committee members on their turn, are trying to keep acquainted with other departments as 
well: personal involvement informs their understanding of the direction the company is 
taking. Naturally, they have admitted that they have a lot of discussions, which is time 
consuming. This is in line with the feeling of the innovation department who expressed that 
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they do not experience straightforward feedback, leaving them free to interpret how they can 
move forward.  
The reactive behavior of the Steering Committee could be seen as stifling, since this time 
consuming process, which can be described as them deducing what the company is doing 
versus comparing to what they think the company needs and then trying to push that vision 
forwards, is not efficient and risky. It could occur that the company ends up in a myriad of 
alternate ideas and interpretations. 
 
It can be seen that both the Steering Committee and the innovation department operate on 
personal knowledge that they obtain from their own background, as well as the information 
they receive from others in the company. The Steering Committee has stated that they employ 
subjective criteria, relying on their gut feeling and question whether fact based decisions 
would be an appropriate replacement, as you need to interpret a concept and connect it to 
other operations in the company in order to determine a total impact. It can be seen how, as a 
result, they do not prepare for meetings, due to their involvement with the innovation 
department and a sense that they have an overall knowledge base that justifies their input. 
This has also been observed by the innovation department, who finds it challenging to keep 
their motivation high. Simultaneously, the innovation department does appreciate the honest 
feedback, combined with their ability to improve since their flexibility and freedom remain 
undisputed. The Steering Committee states that achieving an understanding is time consuming 
and that disagreements regarding ‘what is right’ occur regularly. They tend to highlight the 
feasibility of the company to execute the production of the idea, considering market demand 
and the necessary resources as well. Ideally, they would like the innovation department to 
move closer to the market, so they come up with a use case that the market needs, or holds 
market potential. They thus expressed that the [innovation department] should work closer to 
the customer, yet the innovation department itself perceives the feedback as unconstructive 
and negative. It can be seen how both parties are ‘lost in translation’, since the innovation 
department has not moved closer to the market yet.  This relates to the difficulties in creating 
a mutual understanding, exacerbated by the informal process and the discrepancy in the 
opposing knowledge base. Currently, the Steering Committee is unaware of how the 
[innovation department] operates and do not know how or at what stage knowledge, or old 
concepts, resurface. Here, they again rely on the ability of employees to remember it and 
bring it back on the table, in line with the company culture. However, they do realize that they 
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could improve their feedback and involve the innovation department after the hand-over 
phase.  
 
The Steering Committee strongly believes in keeping the open culture, despite the difficulties 
that have been discussed. It is believed that formalizing innovation will stifle the process and 
employees. Instead, it is argued that the employees need to work close: the right recipe is to 
connect the right people together who will drive the innovation process forward. Yet, since 
the company is experiencing rapid growth, they acknowledge that the size and culture needs 
to be balanced: synchronization is needed to prevent that the company deviates too much 
from the direction that management has in mind: if they even have any clearly specified 
objectives. It is felt that the growth complicates innovation: as innovation is fuzzy in its own 
right and since more people are involved, there are more conflicts regarding how to do things. 
However, since the freedom is a decisive component of the company culture, it is felt that 
there is a need to balance this with direction; yet the Steering Committee finds this a hard 
task.  
 
On a concluding note, it can be seen how normative control has positive characteristics: the 
freedom and informality stimulates employees to act on what they feel would bring positive 
effects for the company. Simultaneously though, it is hard to keep up with this unstructured 
process, since the company is expanding and more parties are involved, which leads to time 
consuming processes and misunderstandings due to a different emphasis or preference of the 
individual employee.  
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5.2 Model building and explanation 
 
After the initial analyses of the two groups, some similarities and differences are apparent. To 
build a model, the aggregated dimensions are compared in figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: Synthesis of aggregated dimensions 
 
Both parties acknowledged during the interviews that there is intuitive consensus-based 
decision-making, political behavior, high levels of normative control, low levels of 
formalization, waste of resources and that the current complexity of the company plays a 
pivotal role in influencing their respective work processes as well as organizational learning. 
Additionally, the innovation department highlighted motivation and both groups the balance 
of exploitation and exploration as crucial dimensions playing a part at the decision-making 
stage. These dimensions therefore are of essential interest to the research and model building 
and are thus the basis of the model’s structure. To make the model dynamic, arrows are used 
to show how the dimensions relate towards and influence one another. Second order themes 
are used to suffuse the model with deeper meaning and make the model traceable back to the 
data structures explained in chapter 4. These themes act as ‘facets’ to the dimensions 
surrounding them (the closer to a dimension the closer the relation) and are not connected to 
the arrows showing correlation and influence.  
The model is located at the decision-making stage from FEI to NPPD, therefore the 
dimensions will be distributed on a three-way grid: Central to the grid are the basic 
controlling dimensions of the decision-making stage that have been identified: the complexity 
of the company, normative control and level of formalization. These three controlling 
dimensions are the fundamental levers to impacting the dimensions that are situated pre- and 
post-decision stage and the decision-making itself. They are distributed vertically on the grid, 
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with complexity of company in the middle as the central regulator between the two 
contrasting dimensions of control: formal and normative. This is because the complexity of 
the company exhibits a negative correlation with normative control (the more complex the 
company, the lower the level of normative control) as the findings suggest that in more 
complex companies, the positive impact of normative control dwindles, but has a positive 
correlation with formalization (the more complex the company, the higher the level of 
formalization) as there is a need for clear processes and objectives due to rising complexity. 
The high levels of normative control exhibited by the case company are negatively correlated 
with the level of formalization, high levels of normative control lead to low levels of formal 
control. As normative control leads to a low level of formalization, managers are less inclined 
to execute their mandate, which has a negative emotional impact on people working at the 
FEI, as they rely on a clear strategy and objectives, as well as support and guidance from the 
management for their innovative product proposals. Normative control on a high level can 
lead to intuitive consensus based decision-making at the FEI, as there is no structure or formal 
process on how to evaluate. The decisions therefore tend to be mostly based on feelings and 
personal opinions, which impedes a clear decision-making, as people tend to act on 
knowledge that is incomplete and different from the fellow decision-makers. This occurrence 
and the fact that employees have high freedom thanks to normative control, can lead to people 
in the FEI ignoring the decision and continue to work under the radar, wasting money and 
manpower on unapproved ideas. The dimensions employee motivation and balance of 
exploitation and exploration are also located in the middle-part of the grid as they either have 
a big influence on the decisions made in that stage (balance of exploitation and exploration) or 
are influenced by it (employee motivation). Employee motivation of employees working at 
the FEI is positively correlated with normative control, as their creativity and innovativeness 
is being nurtured by informality, openness, the individual freedom and flexibility they have 
while working as well as the personal responsibility that is evoked by the management’s trust 
in employees’ loyalty to the company. The more complex the company, the more balance of 
exploitation and exploration needs to be carried out which calls for a structured approach, 
therefore formalization positively affects the balance of exploitation and exploration. 
The initial part of the grid contains the dimensions with most effect on or in the FEI: waste of 
resources and political behavior. Here, waste of resources is horizontally farther from the 
center of decision-making, as the actual waste of resources (overlap in departmental work, 
information gathering) takes place earlier in time then the political behavior (sell-in etc.), 
which happens shortly before the decision-making. The dimension of political behavior is 
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contrarily correlated with normative control and formalization. Whereas normative control 
shows a positive correlation towards political behavior because networking is of crucial 
importance in informal settings, formal control is negatively correlated as formal processes 
and clear mandates and use of formal power counteract political behavior. The complexity of 
a company negatively affects political behavior, as the individual loses the clear view of each 
and every aspect influencing the company’s overall success due to the intricate structure 
accompanying an incumbent company. Therefore, politicking actions that were thought to be 
made in the best interest of the company, now hold the possibility of endangering it. Hence, 
high level of political behavior elicits more waste in terms of resources. Waste of resources in 
turn negatively affects employee’s motivation and the balance of exploitation and exploration. 
 
The last part of the grid showcases intuitive consensus based decision-making and 
organizational learning. These two dimensions are also horizontally distributed in terms of 
time horizon and closer relation to the complexity regulator. The intuitive consensus based 
decision-making happens prior to organizational learning, as it is the feedback that triggers 
the learning process for front end employees. Normative control also influences 
organizational learning, as it incites knowledge transfer that is of personal nature, like the 
intuitive consensus based decision-making. People have to get and share their information via 
networking, which can be time-consuming and a high quality of the information is hard to 
ensure. Information and knowledge stays mostly tacit, as no formal structure is present for 
codification. Organizational learning is consequently also taking place on an individual basis, 
the feedback at the decision-making stage of the FEI being thus essential for the learning 
process of the innovation department and its individuals. However, feedback that is based on 
gut-feeling decisions leads to misinterpretations and misunderstandings and therefore 
negatively affects organizational learning, which then in return negatively affects employee 
motivation. The balance of exploitation and exploration also negatively affects organizational 
learning, as under high levels of normative control, the prioritization of core business over 
new business is not clearly and transparently communicated which hinders learning for 
employees in the front end, but also leaves management as the decision-makers with too little 
time or rigor to learn about new concepts, eroding their basis of learning as well. 
The end result of the model building is displayed in figure 23. Because of its shape and the 
regulating effects of the complexity and control dimensions, the model is named 
Control/Complexity Diamond Model. 
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Figure 23: Control/Complexity Diamond Model for of case company 
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5.3 Relating findings to literature review 
 
The company highlights the importance and necessity of entrepreneurial activities and as 
stated by the SC, it sees explorative innovation efforts not as a waste of resources, which is in 
line with various researches (Nonaka et al., 2000; Bates & Khasawneh, 2005). The activities 
that the innovation department undertakes are performed in informal organizational settings. 
Various authors have stated that freedom to explore new ideas will translate in more 
possibilities to locate opportunities for the company (Kuratko, 2011, chapter 3) which is 
consistent with the high levels of freedom allocated to the innovation department. 
 
In addition, high degrees of uncertainty were identified, which can be understood in light of 
the lack of communication to establish a mutual understanding regarding the activities the 
innovation department undertakes. As a result, the concept may not be aligned with the 
business strategy, which is considered a necessity for successful innovation (Koen et al., 
2001; Zheng et al., 2010). A well-defined product concept is perhaps therefore hard to create 
by the innovation department, since the long-term strategic objectives are not known by them, 
which is considered a necessity (Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009). These problems can be 
understood in the nature of normative control, which is informal and where norms are created 
by setting expectations driven by morals (Alexander, 2012). The innovation department has 
considerable freedom as a result and this is reflective of normative control as well, since this 
relates that there is trust in the employees to act in the best interests of the company: our data 
identified this trust as well (Barley & Kunda, 1992).  
Indeed, it was identified that there are low levels of formal control since there are few 
established standards that are regulated by management (Leifer & Mills, 1996).  
 
Whereas culture is a way of uniting an organization by commitment to a shared goal, this 
stands at odds with the case company, since the data shows that there is no clearly defined 
shared goal, which is unfortunate as this would enable a company to meet its objectives 
(Spender, 1996). The culture is also sets the means by which information, knowledge and 
processes operate and in the case study this consists primarily of personal networks where 
employees of the innovation department need to sell their concepts to others. Whereas this is 
found to increase knowledge indeed (Reagans & McEvily, 2003), this is also identified as a 
troublesome process since not every employee holds significant tenure, which is in line with 
82 
 
the findings of Dougherty & Hardy, who stated that these relations of the network could be 
rather vulnerable because of that factor (1996).  
 
Naturally, an element of risk is hard to circumvent and it is found that organizational learning 
plays a pivotal role in this: yet, the absence of effective learning patterns found in the case 
company, could potentially contribute to a slower pace in developing new products (Gold et 
al., 2001; Liao & Wu, 2010). This enhances the risk that the innovation department works on 
projects that will not be capitulated upon by the company, which could result in a waste of 
resources (Kuratko, 2011, chapter 11).  
 
This is complicated by the lack of some formalization in the communication. It is found that 
in the absence of clearly communicated feedback and no hard decisions, the innovation 
department has no frame of reference and will continue to act as it sees fit. According to 
literature, ineffective communication process, a lack of vision and a lack of formalization are 
found to be the most important barriers to an effective FEI performance (Kim & Wilemon, 
2002; Ho & Tsai, 2011).  Whilst the employees in the innovation department might be 
convinced that they are doing so; other departments or the Steering Committee has a different 
view on what comprises the company’s best interests: which characterizes normative control.   
 
This process is found to become complicated as the company experiences growth. As more 
employees are involved, it becomes increasingly complex to maintain an overview of who to 
approach and to get familiar with each other’s beliefs.  
This relates to organizational learning, again, the process whereby shared understandings and 
strategies change (Miller & Ireland, 2005). Whilst this occurs in the company, the impact 
hereof is unknown as it is personal. The obtained knowledge is tacit and fosters subjective 
insights. However, this knowledge might not accurately reflect how the company is actually 
positioned, for example. Whilst it is stated that tacit knowledge leads to quick decision 
making (Miller & Ireland, 2005) and while the FEI due to its ascribed attributes of uncertainty 
and informality favours tacit knowledge – the decision-making stage in the company is 
characterized by tacit knowledge as well – the problem herein for the company is that there is 
a lack of communication regarding the content of their argumentations (Poskela & Martinsuo, 
2009). Whereas it is identified that the innovation department feels that concepts are not given 
a fair try, these troublesome feelings could be overcome by transparent decision-making 
processes and the formulation of clear goals as this will reduce conflicts and both parties 
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would agree on the direction (Schultz et al., 2013). Yet, this does not occur in the case 
company. If management would provide explicit knowledge, the innovation department could 
internalize this and create tacit knowledge themselves. However, whilst the innovation 
department does internalize feedback, it does not know why the feedback was given which 
could lead to potential errors in interpretation: this will work against effective knowledge 
transfer (Nonaka et al., 2000). Again, this is facilitated by normative control which could 
work in smaller companies: as it is found in the data, normative control worked better when 
the company was smaller. It was found that there is a need to balance the freedom with 
guiding more effectively to ensure the company goes into the same direction, yet this was 
found to be challenging. Indeed, the size of a company makes it less flexible, though in the 
case company, not necessarily bureaucratic: it is not characterized by a hierarchy, which is 
found to be the primary factor of complicating the organizational design of a company 
(Simon, 1962; Perrow, 1972; Karlsson & Olsson, 1998; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004). Yet, as 
the company is large and there is a lack of oversight of the functioning of the various 
departments, this will still make the company rather complex, as there are “a large number of 
parts that interact in a nonsimple way” (Simon, 1962, p. 468).  
 
5.4 Limitations and generalizability of Control/Complexity Diamond  
 
Section 5.2 explained the model built around the findings in the case company. The emerging 
Control/Complexity Diamond model (figure 23) is therefore tailored to the high levels of 
normative control and the correlations/impacts at the decision-making stage based on this 
factor. Bryman and Bell address the problem of generalization from qualitative research in 
saying that “findings of qualitative research are to generalize to theory rather than to 
population” (2011, p.408f.), but that with a transparent research approach and method, the 
quality of deductions made can be assessed and a certain level of generalization is therefore 
possible. If the model of this study is stripped of the illustrating second order themes and the 
level and arrow definitions, the resulting, more basic model (figure 24) could then be 
universally applied to other companies with other preexisting conditions (e.g. high levels of 
formal control) or other areas of interest in the decision-making stage they would like to focus 
on (e.g. employee motivation). As the research of this thesis was limited to investigating the 
effects of high levels of normative control on organizational learning and the decision-making 
stage at the FEI, the dimension of employee motivation is seen as being impacted but looking 
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into the data, no substantiated claims could be made on how it impacts other dimensions in 
return. 
Another limitation is the case company’s working domain, the high-tech sector, which has to 
be taken into account when transferring the results of this paper to other industries where 
working environment and conditions differ greatly from the one presented here, for example 
food and service industry. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: General Control/Complexity Diamond Model  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
This study has shown that the difficulties that companies generally experience regarding the 
need to balance flexibility and firmness, are more complicated when there are high levels of 
normative control. As this leaves room for personal interpretation and tacit knowledge, it is 
found that this lack of transparency in the decision-making phase is counterbalanced by the 
innovation department who questions the validity of the arguments and continues to work on 
their project objectives if they are not convinced by the feedback. Whether this is the right 
thing to do or not is not where we would like to draw our argument: it is the fact that the 
company culture allows for this to happen, ultimately making the decision-making phase a 
fuzzy process as well. Whereas tacit knowledge certainly has benefits, individuals find it hard 
to leverage this knowledge as low formalization levels allow individuals to ignore this. In 
addition, we have found that a lack of managerial overview of the direction the company 
undertakes, works against organizational learning that is shared throughout the company. This 
can be understood in light of the unclear strategy which is created by all employees, as a 
consensus – based collectivity. As there are different methods, preferences and processes that 
employees act on, the ultimate trick seems indeed to engage in political behavior. This 
consists more of the ability to leverage influence, connections and convincing arguments. 
Whilst this might not be seen as problematic in itself, the findings of this thesis have shown 
that a lack of synchronization and mutual understanding between departments leads to 
confusion and independent work styles. Organizational learning in this set-up is very 
personal: you can choose what knowledge you favor and act on, since there is considerable 
freedom to do so. In this, the paper has shown how experience affects learning outcomes. 
Ultimately, it can be seen that these multidimensional outcomes hold conflicting 
interpretations and consequences. It can be seen that there is a necessity to be able to dare and 
set directives, involve the right people and get the mandates that allocate responsibilities to act 
upon.   
The Control/Size Diamond model can be seen as a tool to help the balancing acts in the FEI. It 
shows correlations and effects of different factors and therefore creates understanding for the 
intricate internal processes that are affected by different kinds of control. 
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6.2 Practical implications 
Normative control helps employees identify with the company, feel trusted by having 
responsibility and happy with working conditions that allow openness and community. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this paper show that normative control alone is just feasible for a 
certain sized company. If the company is bigger or grows over a certain number of employees 
and/or gets more complex in structure, formal control could counteract its shortcomings. 
Start-ups therefore can apply this research and using normative control for their front end 
processes alone until they reach a certain headcount or structural dispersion, by which they 
then should in parallel introduce some formal processes. Incumbent firms that might be stuck 
in inertia, low employee motivation and low degree of creative output in the front end, could 
introduce more forms of normative control to regain creativity and employee motivation. 
In addition, the necessity to have a certain structure to share information or to map 
departments in order to establish closer links between employees at different departments has 
been identified. Whilst it is challenging to create an effective system for that, the unique 
dynamic that has brought success in the past and is still wanted by the employees, might 
suffer if this will not be established. It could ultimately occur that the positive sides of 
normative control end up becoming negative effects, which have been highlighted in this 
research as well.  
Management needs to dare to formulate the challenging questions regarding the direction the 
company will take and allocate the appropriate mandates to the employees who will not figure 
out how to act, since this is known, but will have the freedom to determine how to reach 
objectives that are set. As innovation is fuzzy, there is a necessity for freedom: yet, in case of 
rejection, the decisions should be based on criteria that employees can relate to. A clearly 
delineated strategy with established goals which directs the company should be seen to 
overcome these difficulties. 
 
6.3 Future research 
More thorough research is needed to pinpoint the critical factor of complexity that tip the boat 
in favor of more formalized control. When is a company too complex for a predominance of 
normative control? This information can then be added into the Control/Complexity Diamond 
model to make it a more practical tool to be used in business. 
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Testing the model in other environments, namely start-up companies with low complexity and 
high levels of normative control and incumbent firms with high complexity and high levels of 
formal control and their respective decision-making processes from FEI to NPPD would yield 
supplementary information to enhance the Control/Complexity Diamond. It would be 
interesting to further establish to what extent tacit knowledge influences decision-making 
processes that do have formalized objectives and criteria: after all, you need to have an 
understanding, an interpretation, of the potential of an idea which is hard to express in 
numbers. Tacit knowledge cannot be completely ruled out and it would be interesting to see to 
what extent more formalized decision-making processes allow for tacit knowledge to play an 
influential role.  
 
Furthermore, more research regarding the content of knowledge that departments obtain 
would be interesting. This way, an interpretation of what kind of knowledge is captured, 
remembered most would be possible. When the most useful knowledge is identified, more 
insight in what kind of organizational learning system one could establish to be informed 
about whatever information is found to be most valuable could be obtained.  
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide Innovation department 
Interview Guide [innovation department] 
Basic questions about their job 
1. Could you describe your job function at [COMPANY]?  
1.1 How long have you been at [COMPANY]? 
 short: why [COMPANY]? 
 long: why still [COMPANY]? 
1.2 What do you like most about your job? 
1.3 What do you like least about your job? 
1.4 What do you find challenging about your job?  
 (note to us: we be like; please don’t explain the techniques/specs/whatever) 
 follow up: What is the most challenging part (they will prioritize and see what 
matters most for them) 
1.5 How do you deal with these challenges? 
1.6 You’ve worked at [innovation department] for _ years. Did you and if so, how and on 
what grounds, adapt your working style? 
[COMPANY]: opinions 
2. What do you like best about [COMPANY] as a company? 
3. What do you like least about [COMPANY] as a company? 
 
[innovation department] process & idea generation 
 
4. Could you briefly describe what [innovation department] is supposed to be doing? Who told you 
that? When? Did that ever change?  
5. Did [COMPANY]set clear objectives for you on what is expected of you when they hired you? A.k.a. 
‘did you find your role to be different in reality than on paper?’  
 yes: explain 
 no: how did you settle in your job? 
6. Do you think your role changed since you were hired?  
 yes: explain 
7. How would you describe the innovation process of [innovation department]? 
 7.1 Is the work you do, also what you are supposed to be doing according to SC/ 
 management? 
 (follow up; how would you know if you are on the right track in your innovative endeavors?) 
 7.2 What do you like best about this process?  
      (let them explain why of course) 
 7.3 What do you like least about the innovation process of [innovation department]? 
      (follow up: why? How should it be changed? And: could it be changed?) 
8. How do you usually come up with ideas? 
9. How would you describe the scope in which you are to work, if there is one at all? 
10. How do you know whether this idea is in line with the scope you are to work in? So, if the work 
you do is in alignment with [COMPANY]’s objectives? 
11. What criteria are you using to evaluate whether an idea is worth exploring? Did you create those 
yourself or?  
12. Which criterion is most important? Does that depend on the project? (If yes: explain how the 
project influences the criteria that are considered). 
13. What kind of extra information do you need, you think, that would make you perform better? 
14. At what point do you share your idea with [innovation department] members (or other people in 
the organization?)    
 Follow up (if yes/no): why?  
 Follow up (if yes): in what ways is that useful?  
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15. Have you been present at SC meetings? 
 If yes: tell us about your experience! Any changes over the years? Do you want to be in touch 
 with them more often and is so: why?  
 If no: why not? And: do you want to? 
16. What, to your knowledge, are the criteria that the SC uses to evaluate your ideas? 
 16.1 What do they base their criteria on?  
 be like: why do you think that this is what they base their criteria on? 
 16.2 Do you think that is the best/satisfactory way to evaluate from company perspective?  
  if yes: why? 
  if no: why not? 
  16.2.2 Do you think that’s the best/satisfactory way for you; does it please you? 
  → let them explain obviously 
 16.3 Y ou work with new technologies/ideas etc. Do you think SC can accurately 
 assess the potential success?  
  if yes: why do you think that? (suppose they be like: university degrees+tacit) 
  if no: why do you think that? 
 16.4 To what extent do you think more alignment is needed between your job and the 
 wishes  of the SC?  
 Follow up: do you think that could happen earlier in the process? (Before you create your 
 prototype) 
 16.5 Does the SC guide you sufficiently throughout the process?  
  16.5.1 Would you like more follow-up meetings?  
  16.5.2 Are there any pre-set meetings scheduled to discuss the progress?  
  16.5.3 Does the SC take the initiative to get in touch? 
  16.5.4 If you get in touch with them; do they get back to you about it ASAP? 
 17. Do you think the current composition of the SC is sufficient to judge the ideas? 
 18.0 Would you like to provide the SC with more information during the process of the idea 
 development? -- Do you wish to involve them on an earlier stage? Why? Why not? 
 19. How do you prepare to get your idea accepted?  
  19.1 Is there anything lacking in that process, and if so: what? And how should  
 you  then get what you need?  
  19.2 What could be improved about the way you prepare? 
  19.3 What could be improved about the way you present?  
  (if they name something: ask who is to provide them with that and why) 
 
Fun question to end the interview with  
20. Imagine if we are your fairy Godmothers. Then what would you ask us to change about  the 
decision-making stage? 
 
 
 
